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NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING REFORM AND THE
INTIMIDATION OF DEFENSE LAWYERS
Molly R. Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years, two criminal defense lawyers in Northern
Ireland have been murdered as a result of their occupations. Patrick
Finucane, a 38-year-old Belfast solicitor,' was murdered in front of his
wife and three children on Sunday evening, February 12, 1989, when
two masked gunmen entered his home and shot him fourteen times.2
Rosemary Nelson, a Lurgan solicitor, died on March 15, 1999, as a
result of fatal injuries that she suffered when a bomb planted under
her car exploded.' In both cases, loyalist' paramilitaries claimed
responsibility for the murders even though there was no evidence of
paramilitary activity on the part of either attorney.'
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to my
family and friends for their constant support, and especially to the staff of the CAJ
and my friends from Eglantine Avenue for a wonderful summer. Thanks also to
Professor Martin Flaherty for his comments and assistance.
1. The legal systems in Britain and Ireland differentiate lawyers who are
solicitors from lawyers who are barristers. The training for each is different, and
barristers, who are retained by solicitors, may not advertise. Solicitors interview
clients and draft legal documents, while barristers conduct the courtroom work.
2. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense
in Northern Ireland 24 (1993) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Human Rights and Legal Defense].
3. See Warren Hoge, Ulster Lawyer's Killing Casts Suspicion on Police, N.Y.
Times, May 2, 1999, at A3 [hereinafter Hoge, Ulster Lawyer's Killing].
4. Most loyalists/unionists in Northern Ireland are Protestant and wish to
maintain their constitutional tie to Britain. Most republicanstnationalists are
Catholic, and they support a union with the independent Republic of Ireland.
Loyalists and republicans are at the extremes of the conflict and they will often use
violence to achieve their goals. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human
Rights and Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 14.
5. The day after Finucane's murder, the UFF (Ulster Freedom Fighters) claimed
responsibility for the murder, alleging that Finucane was a member of the PIRA
(Provisional Irish Republican Army). See Martin Flaherty, Huntan Rights Violations
Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of Northern Ireland, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 87, 87
(1994) [hereinafter Flaherty, Hunan Rights Violations]. Police later rejected the
UFF's claim, stating that Finucane was simply conducting his professional duties. See
id. The Red Hand Defenders, a dissident loyalist paramilitary group, claimed
responsibility for Rosemary Nelson's murder. See Liam Clarke, Who Killed
Rosemary?, Sunday Times (London), Apr. 25, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL
14488431; Nelson Bomb Suspect Arrested in America: Lawyer's Family Attacks DPP's
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The Finucane and Nelson cases represent the gravest examples of
the harassment of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland. Finucane's
murder became "a symbol of the official intimidation and harassment
endured by defense lawyers involved in politically sensitive cases,"
and Nelson's murder "chilling[ly] echoe[d]" it ten years later.6 Both
Nelson and Finucane were successful human rights defenders who
represented individuals detained under Northern Ireland's emergency
laws.7 Both attorneys were allegedly intimidated by police forces
prior to their deaths, and both had received death threats.8 In each
murder, questions of collusion between the police force, the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and the responsible paramilitaries have
been raised.9 In fact, the international community has called for
Ruling over Police 'Collusion', Observer, Jan. 9, 2000, at 2, available in 2000 WL
7006171 [hereinafter Nelson Bomb Suspect Arrested]. However, the Red Hand
Defenders likely had help from the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the only
loyalist group with the capability to build such a sophisticated bomb. See Nelson
Bomb Suspect Arrested, supra. According to Nelson's clients, police told them that
the disfigurement on one side of her face had been caused by an IRA bomb that
detonated while she was carrying it, when it in fact resulted from an ineffective
operation to remove a birthmark. See Hoge, Ulster Lawyer's Killing, supra note 3.
6. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lawyer to Lawyer Network Action
Update Northern Ireland: Rosemary Nelson (May 1999) <http:l/www.lchr.orgll21/
nelson0599.htm> [hereinafter Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lawyer to
Lawyer Network: Rosemary Nelson].
7. Since its creation in 1922, emergency laws have been in effect in Northern
Ireland as an attempt to address problems associated with political violence and to
combat terrorism on both sides of the conflict. See infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3. These laws
give the police broad powers of arrest and interrogation. See infra Part I.A.3. They
also mandate non-jury trials for terrorist suspects, limit the suspect's right to silence,
and extend the suspect's detention period without allowing access to a lawyer. See
infra Part I.A.3. The emergency system creates an environment in which confessions
are heavily relied upon, and they are often obtained through these extended
detention periods. See infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3.
One of Rosemary Nelson's clients was Colin Duffy, a man prosecuted four times
since 1989, who spent nearly five years in police custody without the charges
ultimately being proved. See Fiona Doherty, Rosemary's Work, Just News (Bull.
Comm. on Admin. of Just., Belfast, Northern Ireland), Mar. 1999, vol. 14, no. 3, at 6,
6. Nelson also represented the family of Robert Hamill, a man allegedly beaten to
death in front of police officers who were sitting in a land rover twenty feet away and
who failed to intervene. See id. Arguably, Nelson was most well-known for her
representation of the Catholic Garvaghy Road residents in Portadown, who wanted
their rights protected when Protestants marched through their neighborhood during
the annual parades celebrating Protestant rule. See id.
Patrick Finucane had several high-profile cases, and was well known for his practice
in criminal defense and human rights. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Human Rights and Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 42, 43. Finucane represented
Bobby Sands, the first prisoner to die in the highly publicized Maze Prison hunger
strikes in which those convicted of paramilitary activity demanded political prisoner
status. See id. at 43. Finucane also helped establish civil claims against the RUC in the
form of tort actions for assault and false imprisonment. See id. In addition, Finucane
"lodged the first successful habeas corpus action in which a detention was held to be
unlawful when the police mistreated the detainee." Id. at 44.
8. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
9. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
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independent inquiries into both murders, in which the RUC would not
have responsibility for conducting the investigations. 10
Both cases also illustrate the dangers that solicitors face in doing
their jobs under the current emergency laws. Persons detained under
Northern Ireland's terrorist legislation meet first with solicitors, who
"advis[e] clients against self-incrimination, protect[ I them against ill-
treatment, and investigat[e] for exculpatory evidence."" As a result,
solicitors are immediately placed in direct contact with members of
security forces who often resent the lawyers for making it more
difficult to incarcerate terrorist suspects.' Additionally, the client's
cause is often mistakenly assumed to be the lawyer's, which results in
part from the attitudes of legislators and police.'
3
The emergency regime in effect in Northern Ireland since 1922
"give[s] the RUC extraordinary police powers"" to "stop, question,
and search people without any suspicion of criminal activity" and to
arrest with minimal information or suspicion. 15 The RUC has not
been impartial throughout the conflict, but instead has served as a
"key player."16  Criticisms of the RUC include over-militarization,
unrepresentativeness of the community amongst its members, lack of
accountability for wrongdoing, mistreatment of detainees in holding
centers, complaints of harassment by the police, and allegations of
police collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups." Since its
establishment in 1922, the composition of the RUC has been
disproportionately Protestant/unionist, and it plays an important role
in the Government's "'counter-terrorist' policy."'" In short, the RUC
does not enjoy widespread support from the Northern Irish
10. See Hoge, Ulster Lawyer's Killing, supra note 3 (stating that "[the United
Nations, the European Parliament and concerned American members of Congress
have joined the legal and rights organizations in calling for an independent
investigation into the deaths"). In fact, the United States House of Representatives
voted to withdraw funding for joint RUC/FBI training until there are independent
inquiries into both murders. See Peter McVerry, Congress Seeks to Cut RUCIFBI
Links, Belfast Telegraph, Apr. 21, 1999, at 8; FBI Training of RUC Officers is
Suspended, Irish Times, July 23, 1999, at 8; see also Joe Carroll, US Call for Nelson
Murder Inquiry, Irish Times, Apr. 21, 1999, at 11 (stating that the House of
Representatives voted to ban the FBI from holding RUC training courses until an
independent inquiry is set up).
11. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense,
supra note 2, at 25.
12- See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 88.
13. See id.; infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
14. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, To Serve Without Favor Policing, Human
Rights, and Accountability in Northern Ireland 16 (1997) [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch, To Serve Without Favor]; see also infra Part I.A.2 for a more detailed
discussion of the emergency legislation.
15. Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 18.
16. Linda Moore, Policing and Change in Northern Ireland: The Centrality of
Human Rights, 22 Fordhan Int'l L.J. 1577, 1579 (1999).
17. See id at 1579-81.




On April 10, 1998, the historic Agreement Reached in the Multi-
Party Negotiations ("Agreement") came into effect, offering a "new
beginning" for the relationship between the British and Irish
governments.19  The Agreement established the Independent
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland ("Policing
Commission") to make recommendations for future policing
structures in Northern Ireland, with the goal of creating widespread
community support for those arrangements." The Policing
Commission published its highly anticipated recommendations on
September 9, 1999, in the Report of the Independent Commission on
Policing in Northern Ireland ("Policing Report" or "Patten
Report").1 The Policing Report advocates a human rights-based
approach to policing and promotes significant changes in such areas as
accountability, policing with the community,22 composition of the
police service, and training, but the Report lacks specific provisions
addressing the problems confronting defense lawyers?23
This Note will discuss the role of the police in Northern Ireland in
the context of the intimidation of defense lawyers, and will examine
whether the implementation of the Policing Commission's
recommendations will mitigate this problem. Part I discusses the
background of the conflict in Northern Ireland, including the role of
the police and the defense attorney under emergency legislation. Part
I also examines international standards specifically pertaining to
defense lawyers. Part II analyzes the Policing Report, including the
composition and organization of the Policing Commission and its
findings. Part III argues that implementation of the Policing Report's
recommendations may help alleviate the problem of intimidation, but
19. See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, at
Declaration of Support [hereinafter Agreement]. This accord is also known as the
"Belfast Agreement" or the "Good Friday Agreement." The Agreement, which 71%
of the voters in Northern Ireland approved in a May 22, 1998, referendum, and
representatives of the major political parties in Northern Ireland approved on April
10, provides that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom unless a
majority of its citizens decide otherwise. See U.S. Dep't of State, 106th Cong., United
Kingdom Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, in 2 Country Reports
on Human Rights Practice for 1998, at 1593 (1999) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of State,
UK Country Report]. Parliament gave the Agreement legislative form in the
Northern Ireland Act of 1998. See id.
20. See Agreement, supra note 19, at Policing and Justice, Annex A.
21. See generally Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, A
New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, chs. 3-20 (1999) [hereinafter Policing
Report] (discussing findings of the Policing Commission and recommendations for
changes in policing).
22. The Commission defines this as "the police participating in the community
and responding to the needs of that community, and the community participating in
its own policing and supporting the police." Id. 1 7.2.
23. See generally Policing Report, supra note 21 (presenting the Commission's
findings regarding policing and its recommendations for changes in the service).
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that the recommendations do not go far enough. It contends that the
Policing Commission should have specifically recommended that
Northern Ireland's emergency legislation be repealed, because the
emergency laws create a culture in which the abuse of solicitors is an
accepted practice. Part III concludes that the intimidation problem
should have been specifically addressed instead of ignored by the
Commission, because it ranks as a significant policing problem in
Northern Ireland.
I. THE NORTHERN IRISH CONFLICT AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
It is impossible to address the issues of policing and the role of
defense lawyers in Northern Ireland without examining the
background of the conflict and Northern Ireland's legal system. This
part provides a brief historical overview of Northern Ireland, a
description of the emergency law system, and specifically, of police
powers under that system. It also describes abuses that defense
lawyers face and the mechanisms currently in place that lawyers can
use to report those abuses. Additionally, it discusses existing
international standards pertaining to defense lawyers and analyzes
those standards in the context of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland.
A. The Emergency Laws of Northern Ireland as a Response to the
Conflict
1. Historical Background of the Conflict
After World War I, the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") engaged in
a violent campaign for independence from Great Britain, causing
Parliament to believe that Irish sovereignty would be in the best
interests of Great Britain. 4 The Protestant minority opposed Irish
autonomy, and the island was ultimately divided into two parts."5
Twenty-six predominantly Catholic counties became independent
under the British Commonwealth as the Irish Free State, which later
created a constitution and left the Commonwealth to ultimately
become the Republic of Ireland in 1949.26 The other six counties,
which were part of the northern province of Ulster, became Northern
Ireland, a self-governing unit wvithin the United Kingdom. 7
24. See generally J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence,
1967-1992 (1993) (providing an overview of the Northern Irish political conflict); see
also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense, supra
note 2, at 13.
25. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 13.
26. See id. at 13-14; Bell, supra note 24, at 26.
27. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 14. These six counties remained dependent as part of the
United Kingdom, but could govern themselves in areas concerning specific domestic
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From the start, the Northern Ireland Parliament was dominated by
a Protestant majority, and Catholics became increasingly frustrated as
they experienced discrimination in employment, housing, education,
and voting rights. 28 In the late 1960s, some Catholics participated in
peaceful civil rights demonstrations while others joined the IRA to
achieve through violence their goal of uniting with Ireland.29 As some
unionists responded violently to both methods, paramilitary activity
on both sides of the conflict grew, and in 1969, the British army was
called in and has since remained. 0 Because of the rising death toll,
the government of the United Kingdom first suspended the Northern
Ireland Parliament in 1972 and then later abolished it, imposing a
system of direct rule.31
As a result of the ratification of the Agreement and recent strides
toward peace in Northern Ireland, on December 1, 1999, Queen
Elizabeth approved legislation transferring powers to the new
Northern Ireland Assembly, creating the first government directly
accountable to the people of Northern Ireland in nearly twenty-five
years.32 However, Northern Ireland's self-government was suspended
on February 11, 2000, because of a conflict over dismantling
matters. See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland's Criminal Trials Without
Jury: The Diplock Experiment, 5 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 239,240-41 (1999).
28. See Peter G. Eikenberry, et al., Northern Ireland: A Report to the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York from a Mission of the Committee on International
Human Rights, at 4 (June 1999) [hereinafter Bar Report]; see also Flaherty, Human
Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 93-94; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Human Rights and Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 14-15.
29. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 15.
30. See id.
31. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 4-5; Flaherty, Human Rights Violations,
supra note 5, at 93-94; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights &
Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 16. Under this system, Northern Ireland holds seats in
the British Parliament in Westminster, and most legislation occurs through Orders in
Council, which the Commons and Lords must approve before referral to the Queen
for final approval. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and
Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 16. Parliament can also enact statutes directly binding
on Northern Ireland. See id. In terms of executive authority, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland serves in the British Cabinet and manages the Northern Ireland
Office (NIO), and is also responsible for security policy. See id. However, the Chief
Constable of the RUC runs security operations and answers not to the Government
but to the law and the courts. See id. The emergency laws are direct Acts of
Parliament. See id. at 17. Therefore, the United Kingdom government controls
Northern Ireland through the Northern Ireland Office, headed by the Secretary of
State. See Brice Dickson, The Legal System of Northern Ireland 5 (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter Dickson, The Legal System].
32. See Giant Step Toward Peace Says Blair, Irish Times on the Web: Breaking
News (Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/breaking/1999/1201/break15.
htm>. With this transfer, the Northern Ireland Assembly has the power to enact
legislation regarding local affairs. The Assembly is comprised of both Protestant and
Catholic representatives, as embodied in the Agreement. See Warren Hoge, Northern
Ireland Picks Up the Reins of its Government, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1999, at Al.
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paramilitary arms.33 Recent hopes for peace remain cautious due to
previous broken ceasefires and post-Agreement acts of violence. 4
Presently, approximately 55% of the population in Northern Ireland
is Protestant, and 45% is Catholic. 5 While there have been fewer
political killings since 1972, hundreds of people a year continue to be
injured because of the security situation. 6 Since the start of the
"Troubles," the numbers in the security forces have significantly
increased. Currently, the RUC has approximately 13,000 officers,
with a regular force of 8500, a Full Time Reserve of 2900, and a Part
Time Reserve of 1300, in addition to 3000 full-time equivalent
civilians.37  This is a large police service for a population of 1.675
million people.38
2. The Emergency Law System
To address the problem of political violence, emergency legislation
has been in effect since Northern Ireland's creation in 1922. The
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act ("EPA") applies only
to Northern Ireland, and it succeeds the Civil Authorities (Special
Powers) Acts (Northern Ireland) 1922-33.31 The EPA 1996, as
amended by the EPA 1998, is the most current law in a series of
amended versions to the original 1973 EPA' The Prevention of
33. See Warren Hoge, Britain Suspends Self-Government in North Ireland, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12,2000, at Al.
34. See Irish Times on the Web, The Long Road to the Talks Table (visited Mar.
27, 2000) <http://www.ireland.com/special/peaceltroubles/troubles_chron.htm>
(documenting a chronology of events from 1991 to 1997). In 1994, both sides of the
conflict declared a ceasefire, which the IRA broke in 1996. See id. The ceasefire has
since been reinstated. See hi. However, on August 15, 1998, an IRA bomb exploded
in Omagh, ultimately killing 29 people. See James F. Clarity, Bomb in Ulster,
Exploding Among Shoppers, Kills 28, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1998, at Al (stating that
"[t]he blast raised fears for the survival of the Northern Ireland peace agreement");
James F. Clarity, Ulster Buries Bomb Victims, Fearfid for Peace Accord, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 1998, at A8.
35. See Rasnic, supra note 27, at 241.
36. Injuries typically result from bombs or paramilitary-style attacks. One
hundred and two people were already injured in January and February of 2000. See
RUC, Injuries as a Result of the Northern Ireland Security Situation 1968-1998 (visited
Mar. 27,2000). <http'//vww.ruc.police.uk/presststatisticsinjury2.htm>
37. See Policing Report, supra note 21, T 13.1.
38. See id
39. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, § 64 (Eng.);
Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 5
(N. Ir.) (replacing the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch.
31 (Eng.) and becoming permanent in 1933); see also Dickson, The Legal System,
supra note 31, at 162-63. For a current, comprehensive discussion of Northern
Ireland's emergency laws, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification ofan Emergency
Regime, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 1353 (1996) (discussing the application of the emergency laws
during the cease-fire period).
40. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, § 59 (Eng.);
see also Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 162; Human Rights Watch, To
Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 16.
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Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 ("PTA") contains
comparable provisions to the EPA, and it applies to the entire United
Kingdom.41 Parliament considers renewing the Acts on an annual
basis, and it recently extended both Acts.42  Although ordinary
criminal laws are in effect via the 1989 Police and Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order ("PACE"), 43 the Government does not
believe they are capable of effectively addressing terrorism, and thus
emergency legislation is thought necessary to "strengthen" those
laws.44
Together, the EPA and PTA extend police powers beyond ordinary
bounds while limiting the rights of terrorist suspects. In 1970, a
Parliamentary Commission headed by Lord Diplock recommended
that juryless trials before a single judge would alleviate some of the
problems arising from the violence in Northern Ireland.45 These
recommendations were promulgated into statute in 1973,46 leading to
the repeal of the Special Powers Act and the passage of the EPA.47
Thus, when a charge relates to terrorism, the defendant is "scheduled"
for a Diplock non-jury trial.4 Additionally, the EPA "empowers the
police to stop and question individuals regarding identity and recent
movements and further authorizes the search of persons and
41. See Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, ch. 4 (Eng.).
42. See id.; Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1998, ch. 9 (Eng.); see
also Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 162-63. Periodically, the
Government sponsors reviews of the EPA and PTA to "'consider the future need for
specific counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom if the cessation of
terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland leads to a lasting peace.'
Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 16-17 (quoting Rt.
Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism (London:
HMSO, Oct. 1996), p.v.)). The Government appoints an independent reviewer to
report annually to Parliament on the use of the emergency powers during the
previous year. See Northern Ireland Office, Law & Order: Counter-Terrorism
Legislation (last modified Apr. 1998) <http://www.nio.gov.uk/coterleg0498.htm>
[hereinafter NIO, Counter- Terrorism Legislation].
43. PACE applies to non-scheduled offenses and provides for a fairer, more
traditional criminal procedural code than that provided by the EPA or the PTA, thus
ensuring greater protection for defendants. See Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense, supra note 2, at 18-19; Symposium, The
Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, 40 N. Ir. Legal Q. 319,
319-21 (1989) (providing a detailed description of PACE).
44. See NIO, Counter-Terrorism Legislation, supra note 42 (stating that "the EPA
provides the criminal justice system and the police and Army in Northern Ireland
with the provisions they need to be effective against terrorism"); see also Bar Report,
supra note 28, at 8.
45. See Rasnic, supra note 27, at 243 & n.14. According to the Northern Ireland
Office, juryless trials are "necessary to safeguard the judicial process against the risks
of jury intimidation and the returning of perverse verdicts." NIO, Counter-Terrorism
Legislation, supra note 42.
46. See Rasnic, supra note 27, at 243 n.14.
47. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 18.
48. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, § 1 (Eng.);
Rasnic, supra note 27, at 245.
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residences, as well as examination and seizure of documents, all
without prior judicial approval."49 The PTA allows authorities to,
among other things, "arrest, detain, and interrogate individuals for up
to seven days without an appearance before a magistrate." '
Periodically, the Government will review the EPA and the PTA as
an accountability measure, and will examine whether the emergency
provisions are still needed.51 Some reviewers have recommended
steps toward dismantling the emergency regime,52 but in the past the
Government apparently believed that the laws could not be repealed
until peace was established. 3 Arguably, with the ratification of the
Agreement, peace now exists. In December 1998, the United
Kingdom Home Office and the Northern Ireland Office' called for
the repeal of the PTA and the EPA, which did not ultimately occur,55
but also warned that they would introduce temporary emergency
provisions if terrorist activity reoccurs. 6
The EPA and the PTA create a system in which convictions are
sought based on "confessions obtained through extended periods of
detention and interrogation."'  In maintaining this system, the United
Kingdom on several occasions has derogated from international
human rights undertakings.58 In November of 1998, the United
49. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense,
supra note 2, at 18.
50. 1&
51. See supra note 42.
52. See Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 16-17
(referring to Lord Lloyd's recommendations in Oct. 1996).
53. See id. at 17.
54. See supra note 31 for further explanation of the Northern Ireland Office.
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 7-8 (referring to 1998 White Paper entitled
"Legislation Against Terrorism"). Some of the suggested measures include a
continuation of Diplock courts, bail restrictions, lower standards for admitting
confessions into evidence, and incorporating the current PTA provisions that allow
police to hold a suspect for up to 48 hours without access to a solicitor into ordinary,
non-emergency law. See id. at 8 & nn.14-17.
57. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal Defense,
supra note 2, at 17.
58. The United Kingdom entered derogations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on December 23, 1988, and May 17, 1976, and
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on December 23, 1988,
December 18, 1978, December 12, 1975, September 19, 1975, August 16, 1973,
January 23, 1973, August 20, 1971, September 25, 1969, and June 27, 1957. See id. at
17 n.11. Under Article 4.1 of the ICCPR, to which the United Kingdom is a party, a
state may derogate from its obligations "[i]n time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The European Court of Human Rights found that the United
Kingdom's seven-day detention period violated Article 5(3) of the ECHR, which
requires that detainees be brought before a court "promptly." See Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5(3), 213
U.N.T.S. 222, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 1989 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 160 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). Rather than repealing the legislation, the
1885
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Kingdom government passed the Human Rights Act 1998,19 which
incorporates the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "Convention") into the
United Kingdom's domestic law.6° Courts in the United Kingdom
may not void a parliamentary act, but may determine whether both
proposed terrorism legislation and existing statutes and criminal
practices are compatible with the Convention.61 United Kingdom
courts will therefore be more active in "insuring compliance with
international human rights standards."'62
3. Police Powers of Arrest, Detention, and Interrogation and Their
Effects on the Role of the Defense Attorney
Terrorist suspects are treated differently under the emergency
system than other detainees are under the ordinary criminal law. The
police are given far broader powers of arrest, detention, and
interrogation with respect to terrorist suspects. Under section 14 of
the PTA, the police may arrest without a warrant "any person whom
they reasonably suspect to be guilty of certain specified offences or of
being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts
of terrorism."'63 Under section 18 of the EPA, an officer may arrest
without warrant "any person who[m the officer] has reasonable
grounds to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to
commit a scheduled offence or an offence under this Act which is not
a scheduled offence."'  The arrest powers under the EPA are rarely
invoked because the PTA grants police broader powers to arrest
based on extremely limited suspicion or information.65 Statistics
suggest that the RUC abuses its arrest powers. In 1998, of the 566
persons arrested under the PTA, only 131 (23%) were charged with
an offense.' Perhaps these suspects simply did not supply enough
Government derogated under the ICCPR, and evidence suggests that it derogated not
out of necessity for its use but rather in response to an adverse court decision. See
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads: Human Rights and the
Northern Ireland Peace Process 11 & n.16 (1996) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, At the Crossroads] (stating that the European Court recognized that
the Brogan decision may have prompted the derogation).
59. See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
60. See U.S. Dep't of State, UK Country Report, supra note 19.
61. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 9.
62. Id.
63. Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 163. This law arguably violates
Article 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, under which reasonable
suspicion is necessary to make an arrest. Mere "concern" does not constitute an
offense under United Kingdom law. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 10.
64. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, § 18 (Eng.).
65. See Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 17-18.
66. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 12 (citing Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, Sixth
Annual (1998) Report of the Independent Commissioner for the Holding Centres
(Mar. 31, 1999)).
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evidence that the police could rely upon to support a charge, but
evidence suggests that police use their arrest powers as harassment
techniques or for reasons other than criminal investigation.67
Under section 14 of the PTA, police may detain a suspect for up to
forty-eight hours and the Secretary of State may extend this period for
up to five days.6s Roughly one-third of those arrested under the PTA
are held beyond the forty-eight-hour period.69 At no time must the
officer justify the detention to a judicial officer.70 In legislation
proposed in 1998,7' the Government suggested that judicial
authorization by an independent commission of judges and
magistrates be necessary to extend the detention period beyond the
initial forty-eight hours.7' Under this proposed legislation, however,
the detainee still would not have access to legal intervention for the
first forty-eight hours because under the PTA the police have the
power to deny the detainee access to a solicitor during that period. 3
Furthermore, police can continue to deny access to a solicitor for
another forty-eight hours under section 47(8) of the EPA,74 and even
after access to a solicitor is granted, the solicitor still cannot be present
during interrogation.'
These provisions create a system in which police officers, acting on
minimal suspicion, have the power to arrest and freely interrogate
suspects with little supervision. Confessions are heavily relied upon in
Northern Ireland's criminal justice system, which makes it crucial to
ensure that police are not improperly obtaining confessions and that
legal standards are strict enough to exclude unreliable confessions. 6
For traditional, non-scheduled77 offenses, a confession is admissible if
the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement
was not obtained by "oppression or in consequence of anything said
67. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Northern Ireland 14 (1991)
(describing the experiences of three prisoners who were arrested several times and
released without charge, after being subjected to long periods of interrogation,
threats, abuse, and efforts to convince them to become informers); see also Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58, at 8 (describing
interviews of arrested detainees who said that their interviews focused on general
issues such as the peace process rather than questions about specific offenses).
68. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 164. The Secretary of State
nearly always grants the request for extension, and in 1998 all 125 requests were
granted. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 13.
69. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 164.
70. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 12-13.
71. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
72. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 14.
73. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 164.
74. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 15 (citing EPA § 47(8)).
75. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 164.
76. See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Northern Ireland. supra note 67,
at 30-31.
77. Non-scheduled offenses are non-terrorist offenses, where the suspect receives
a jury trial. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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or done which was likely to render it unreliable."7 For scheduled
terrorist offenses, however, a statement is currently admissible unless
the defendant produces prima facie evidence of coercive techniques
used by the police, specifically, that he or she was subjected to
"'torture, to inhuman or degrading treatment, or to any violence or
threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture), in order to
induce [an accused] to make the statement."'79 The burden then shifts
to the prosecution to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.8" Under this standard, "physical deprivation or psychological
pressure short of outright violence is permissible."'" Hence, the
prosecution is rarely prevented from admitting involuntary
confessions, for the defendant faces significant problems in obtaining
evidence of coercion "in a setting where the only others present are
the ones who would have the opportunity and incentive to coerce the
confession in the first place."'
The modification of ordinary criminal law also restricts terrorist
suspects' right to silence, which "helps the authorities gain convictions
by relying on negative inferences of what a defendant did not say
rather than on affirmative evidence of what a defendant did say. 8 3
Under the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988,
prosecutors, judges, and juries may infer guilt from a detainee's
silence.' The inference alone is not sufficient for conviction, but it
can be used to corroborate other evidence implicating the accused.
Once again, legal counsel is of paramount importance here because
most detainees will not know the consequences of speaking or
remaining silent.86
Recent developments provide some hope for increased protection
of detainees' rights. In May 1999, audio recording of police interviews
78. Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 138 (citing article 74 of the
PACE Order 1989).
79. Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 23 (quoting
section 12(2)(b) of the EPA) (alteration in original); see also Rasnic, supra note 27, at
248 (stating that "[t]he common law rule that a confession is admissible evidence only
if it was voluntarily made has been substantially modified under the Diplock
system").
80. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 165.
81. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58, at
121.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 120.
84. See Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, art. 3 (No. Ir.);
Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 136. This restriction on the right to
silence was extended to the rest of the United Kingdom under section 34 of the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. See Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58, at 35-36.
85. See Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 136.
86. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58,
at 120.
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was introduced for the first time,81 which will help ensure that the
interview process is carried out fairly and will make it easier for a
detainee to establish prima facie evidence of coercion. Although not
a substitute for a solicitor's presence, the tape recording provides a
mechanism by which the accuracy of interviews can be checked, and
will discourage police from treating detainees inappropriately.
Additionally, the Government's 1998 proposed legislation would
repeal the provisions of the EPA that forbid a solicitor from seeing a
client for another forty-eight hours after the initial detention period
and from being present at an interview.' As long as the emergency
laws are in place, however, a culture exists in which police have the
liberty to do virtually whatever it takes to incarcerate a suspect, even
if they are abusing the detainee's rights in the process.
B. Abuses of Defense Lawyers Under the Emergency System
There are approximately 1700 solicitors in Northern Ireland, a small
number of whom work on politically sensitive cases.' It is virtually
impossible for defense lawyers to collaborate by sharing information
or assisting one another because they work in several different firms
that do not have close connections." Solicitors who represent
criminal defendants also face resentment from police and civil
solicitors because Northern Ireland has a progressive system in which
the Government will pay for any criminal defense lawyer of the
client's choosing. 91 Religion aggravates the situation because most
criminal defense lawyers are Catholic, while the police force is
overwhelmingly Protestant. Police maintain an "us versus them"
attitude even though Catholic and Protestant lawyers represent both
loyalist and republican detainees with the same intensity."3
87. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, ch. 22, § 53A (Code
of Practice) (Eng.). The Code applies to persons arrested under certain sections of
the PTA as well as specific cases designated by the Secretary of State. See id. The
RUC resisted audio recording of interrogations because it argued that audio
recording would make it easier for terrorists to find out whether detainees had
become informers. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads,
supra note 58, at 124.
88. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 15-16.
89. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, Mr. Pararn Cumaraswamy, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, 54th
Sess., 1 32, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1998139/Add.4 (1998) [hereinafter Report oftie Special
Rapporteur.
90. See id. 33; Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 97 (-Since
solicitors' firms in Northern Ireland rarely exceed three or four partners,
decentralization and disorganization results. Defense practitioners are spread out
among seven or eight firms, none of which are in close contact.").
91. See id at 97 n.45 (citing interviews with three criminal defense solicitors in
Northern Ireland).
92. See id at 97; Rasnic, supra note 27, at 251 (stating that only 8% of the police
force is Catholic).
93. See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 97 (stating that -no
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These hostile attitudes toward defense solicitors are maintained and
exacerbated by the emergency law and criminal justice systems, which
combine to create an environment ripe for the harassment of defense
lawyers. Prolonged detention, easy admissibility of confessions, and
effective elimination of the right to silence result in "a system that
gives the security forces every incentive to rely on confessions
obtained in custody and, in turn, to impede solicitors who are often
the only significant hurdle in the race to obtain convictions."94 The
more effectively these lawyers act as "hurdles," the more they are
subjected to intimidation and harassment by officials.95 A 1992
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights mission found that almost
every lawyer who represented detainees under the emergency laws
had been the victim of some form of official intimidation.96
The public assertions of government officials identifying lawyers
with their clients' causes also create great concern because such
statements may encourage police officers engaging in abuses.' For
example, three weeks before Patrick Finucane's murder, Douglas
Hogg, a Home Office Minister, stated in Parliament that "'[t]here are
in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are unduly
sympathetic to the cause of the IRA."' 98 Officials have also publicly
speculated that money paid to solicitors helps to finance terrorist
causes.
99
Defense lawyers are intimidated in several ways. Among the most
common allegations of harassment are death threats and interference
with the attorney/client relationship and the right to counsel of choice.
Credible evidence also suggests that police and paramilitary forces
may collude to intimidate lawyers from taking on criminal defense
cases.1" Solicitors rarely file formal complaints about harassment,
evidence has ever been presented to prove that lawyers in Northern Ireland
discriminate between clients on the basis of religion").
94. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58, at
116.
95. See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 98.
96. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 27. A follow-up mission in June 1995 found a decline in the
reported instances of harassment of lawyers, but this decline was not the result of
reforms by the authorities but of a reduction in emergency detentions and custodial
interrogations during the 1994-1996 ceasefires. The solicitors and detainees
interviewed stressed that the same patterns of abuse continued to occur in detentions
that took place during the ceasefires. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At
the Crossroads, supra note 58, at 89, 98-101.
97. See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 100.
98. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note 67, at
101.
99. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 33-36 (noting statements made by Ken Maginnis, an Ulster
Unionist MP, and Lord Colville, a reviewer appointed by the Government to assess
the security situation in Northern Ireland).
100. See infra Part I.B.3. for a description of this evidence.
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however, because they believe that the current complaints system is
futile and ineffective. 1 1 The following sections illustrate the types of
defense attorney harassment that the emergency laws and criminal
justice system propagate and reinforce.
1. Death Threats
Death threats are the most severe form of intimidation that defense
lawyers in Northern Ireland experience. Almost every solicitor
interviewed by the Lawyers Committee during a 1992 mission related
stories of death threats. 102 Many threats occur in detention centers,
where an officer may make a threatening remark about a detainee's
solicitor to the detainee. 03 In one alleged instance, interrogators
threatened the clients of a solicitor and the solicitor himself, and the
clients were later killed."' Additionally, anonymous threats are made
via telephone or in writing.1 - Solicitors began taking death threats
much more seriously after Patrick Finucane's murder, particularly
when the threats made reference to Finucane.'" Finucane himself
experienced death threats, which became more serious and persistent
in the year before his death."°
Rosemary Nelson also received death threats through her clients
before she was killed."m In September 1998, she testified before the
101. See infra Part I.B.4.
102. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 27-29. These pages describe threats received by solicitors
and their clients in detail. For example, one detainee interviewed by the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights described the response of interrogators when she asked
for Madden & Finucane, a public interest firm established in 1979 by Peter Madden
and Patrick Finucane, as counsel. One of the interrogators said that Patrick Finucane
had ended up in a body bag and that another solicitor at Madden & Finucane "would
end up the same way." Id. (quoting Lawyers Committee for Human Rights interview
of Geraldine O'Connor, Sept. 3, 1992.) Even since Nelson's death, two solicitors told
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights that several RUC officers have threatened
them. See Vincent Kearney, RUC Officers Have Threatened Solicitors, Say US
Investigators, Sunday Times (London), Nov. 21, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL
30048300. In addition, a study by the Geneva-based International Commission of
Jurists found that more lawyers in Northern Ireland were the victims of death threats
and harassment than in any other part of the European Union. See Robert Verkaik,
Ulster is Worst for Threats to Lawyers, Independent (London), Apr. 12, 1999, at 6.
103. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 26-27.
104. See id at 27.
105. See, e-g., id. at 31-32 (giving examples of anonymous threats).
106. See id. at 27; supra text accompanying notes 1-6 for a description of Finucane's
case.
107. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 49-50 (describing in detail the threats Finucane received).
108. See Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 173-75
(describing in detail threats that Nelson received); supra text accompanying notes 3-6
for a description of Nelson's case. Nelson also received anonymous written death
threats that the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) forwarded to
Northern Ireland's Security Minister, Adam Ingram, in the summer of 1998. See Clare
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International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee of the
U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee
and described the difficulties she experienced with the RUC.' °
Nelson stated that "[t]hese difficulties have involved RUC officers
questioning my professional integrity, making allegations that I am a
member of a paramilitary group and, at their most serious, making
threats against my personal safety, including death threats." 1"0
2. Interference with Attorney/Client Relations and Choice of
Counsel
In addition to allegations of death threats, other allegations suggest
that police attempt either to create a barrier between solicitor and
client, or to frighten suspects away from choosing a particular
solicitor."' Although less serious than death threats, this kind of
interference is more common.12  Comments made by police to
detainees may take the form of slander against a solicitor's
competence or accusations of IRA involvement." 3 One solicitor told
Murphy, Flanagan Asked to Explain Claim that RUC Did Not Know of Threats to
Murdered Lawyer, Irish Times, May 27, 1999, at 8. In a letter to the CAJ, Ingram
indicated that the threats had been passed on to the RUC for investigation. See id.
However, shortly before Nelson's murder in 1999, the Chief Constable indicated that
the RUC did not have information suggesting Nelson was "the subject of a specific
terrorist threat." Id. (quoting Sir Ronnie Flanagan). After the murder, Flanagan
stated that "[w]e [the RUC] as an organization, had no intelligence whatever to
substantiate a specific threat to Rosemary Nelson's life prior to her dreadful murder."
60 Minutes: RUC (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 21, 1999, at 17) [hereinafter 60
Minutes] (transcript on file with Fordham Law Review).
109. See Rosemary Nelson, Statement to the US Congressional Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights, (Sept. 29, 1998), reprinted in Just News
(Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast, Northern Ireland), Mar. 1999,
vol. 14, no. 3, at 7 [hereinafter Nelson, Congressional Testimony]; see also David
McKittrick, Ulster Lawyers 'Threatened by RUC', Independent (London), Mar. 21,
1999, at 7 (stating that "[tihe striking thing" about Nelson's allegation of threats "is
not that it was unusual but rather the opposite: it was so familiar as to be a matter
almost of routine in certain legal circles").
110. Nelson, Congressional Testimony, supra note 109. Recently, the DPP decided
not to take action against the RUC officers who allegedly threatened Nelson. See
Gerry Moriarty, DPP Ruling on Alleged Nelson Death Threats Angers Family, Irish
Times, Jan. 10, 2000, at 7. One nationalist said, "What other outcome could be
expected when the RUC were investigating death threats which had allegedly been
made by their own officers?" Nationalist Anger at 'Whitewash Operation', Irish Times,
Jan. 10,2000, at 7.
111. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 29-31.
112. See id. For a detailed list of threats, verbal abuse, and derogatory remarks
made by the RUC about solicitors at police stations from 1989-1991, see Human
Rights Watch, Human Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note 67, at 179-92.
Detention centers (or "holding centres") are the sites of most lawyers' allegations of
abuse. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58,
at 94.
113. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 29.
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the Lawyers Committee that all of his clients had heard these kinds of
comments.1 Another reported that police would tell clients that their
solicitors did not care about them personally and only wanted to make
money from their representation.1 5  These comments occur so
frequently that many clients do not even tell their solicitors about
them, but those who do, corroborate the solicitors' allegations., 6
Some police statements attempt to interfere with the attorney/client
relationship by intimidating clients into changing their mind about
their choice of solicitor. Several clients of one solicitor stated that
when they chose Madden & Finucane" 7 for representation, the police
charged that the detainee must be a member of the IRA."8 This kind
of allegation can cause detainees to choose another lawyer so as not to
appear to be affiliated with the IRA. In addition, comments like these
scare Protestants away from choosing particular solicitors when the
police criticize them for their choice of a Catholic solicitor."9
3. Collusion
Perhaps even more disturbing than the evidence of harassment of
defense lawyers by the RUC is the evidence of collusion between
police and paramilitary organizations. Collusion can take the form of
directly conspiring with a terrorist group, failing to prevent a violent
act for which there was reliable advance notice, or failing to
investigate terrorist acts in order to find the responsible party.'
Because the RUC investigates cases involving paramilitary violence,
allegations of collusion may arise, particularly when loyalist
paramilitary organizations obtain official information.' 2' According to
the RUC Chief Constable, there have been very few cases of officers
supplying official information and those cases have been "'dealt
with.""' However, no charge of collusion against an officer has ever
been acknowledged.'2 The RUC also contends that if collusion does
occur, it is not institutionalized but rather is the result of some "'bad
apple[s]"' on the force. 24 The RUC seems to be "conceding that it
114. See id. (quoting an interview with an Omagh solicitor).
115. See id. at 30.
116. See id. (describing remarks heard by detainees about their solicitors reported
to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).
117. See supra note 102.
118. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 31.
119. See il (describing an instance in which a Protestant detainee chose a Catholic
solicitor and was rebuked by the police for choosing "a murdering Provo bastard'").
120. For other examples of collusion in this setting, see Human Rights Watch, To
Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 140.
121. See id. at 141.
122. Id- (quoting RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan from a Nov. 11, 1996,
interview).
123. See id.
124. Id. (citing Paddy Hillyard, "The Politics of Policing and Policing Itself: The
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cannot exercise sufficient control over all [of] its officers and security
procedures while, at the same time, it disclaims any responsibility for
the loyalist killings of members of the minority Catholic community,
be they nationalist, republican, or indifferent, due to that lack of
control. ' ' "2
However, in a 1993 report, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights presented credible evidence of official collusion by both the
British Army and the RUC in Patrick Finucane's murder. 12 6 A follow-
up report in 1996 indicated that there had been no prosecutions in the
murder, the RUC had not interviewed murder witness Geraldine
Finucane, nor had the RUC interviewed any of Patrick Finucane's
colleagues about evidence of collusion. 127 Thus, there was reason to
Stalker Affair," Paper presented at an international conference on "Policing the
Peace," University College Galway, Aug. 23-25, 1995, p.11).
125. Id. at 142.
126. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 52-57 (providing a detailed account of the evidence). The
LCHR gathered information from a fact-finding mission to Northern Ireland during
which they interviewed solicitors, barristers, former detainees, journalists,
government officials, police officials, and human rights activists. See id. at iii-v. The
names of certain sources were kept confidential either at their request or out of safety
concerns. See id. The RUC criticized the report's allegations as being
unsubstantiated, but the LCHR received no assistance from the RUC during its
mission. See id. There was arguably enough evidence to substantiate an independent
inquiry into the murder. See id. In addition, several human rights groups have
documented cases that suggest collusion and have called on the British government to
address the issue, but apparently have received no effective response. See Human
Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 143 & n.348.
127. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58,
at 111-12. London Metropolitan Police Deputy Commissioner John Stevens
conducted two inquiries, in 1990 and 1995, examining allegations of collusion between
security forces and loyalist paramilitaries. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Northern Ireland Update 4 (1999) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Northern Ireland Update]. The first inquiry ended in the prosecution of 59
members of loyalist paramilitaries but not in a prosecution for Finucane's murder. See
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58, at 109. In
regard to the second investigation, Stevens indicated that he could not comment, but
that any information he turned up would have been given to the RUC and the
Director of Public Prosecutions. See id. at 110. The results of both inquiries were kept
confidential, and the extent of the investigations remains unclear. See id. at 111;
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Northern Ireland Update, supra, at 4.
Another inquiry into Finucane's murder, overseen by Stevens, was begun in April
1999 as a result of new evidence regarding official collusion, and Stevens recently said
there has been "'good progress to date, but six to nine months' intensive work still
needs to be done."' Finucane Inquiry to 'Take Another Six Months,' Irish Times on
the Web: Breaking News (Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.ireland.com/newspaperl
breaking/1999/1201/breakl3.htm>; see also David McKittrick, British Security Services
'Colluded with Loyalists' in Ulster Murders, Independent (London), May 4, 1999, at 1
(providing a description of the new evidence of collusion); British Irish Rights Watch,
Justice Delayed: Alleged State Collusion in the Murder of Patrick Finucane and Others,
1.2, 1.3 (Feb. 2000) <http://www.fhit.org/birw/justice.html> (describing a
confidential report that British Irish Rights Watch delivered to the British and Irish
governments and the United Nations in February 1999, detailing evidence of collusion
in Patrick Finucane's murder and noting that the British government has not denied
2000] NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING REFORM
suspect the RUC's denials of collusion in the murder.
In June 1999, William Stobie, an informer for the RUC Special
Branch, was arrested for Finucane's murder.'2 Stobie claims that he
turned over paramilitary information regarding Finucane's planned
murder to the police before the attack, but they failed to prevent it.
He also claims that he gave the police detailed information about the
movements of the murderers' weapons, but they again did not act.,-
In addition, Stobie had been previously arrested for possession of
illegal arms found in his home.' When the possession matter went to
trial, Stobie allegedly threatened to publicly expose his knowledge
about Finucane's murder, which was communicated to a DPP
representative."' Shortly thereafter, the trial was aborted due to a
police officer's "elementary" procedural mistake during testimony.'-"
Stobie also claims that, at the time of the possession trial, his lawyers
told a DPP representative that he was a police informer, resulting in
the abortion of the case and no formal offer of evidence by the DPP
against Stobie."1 Moreover, recent news reports indicate that Stobie
had been arrested and questioned about the murder in September
1990. At that time, Stobie confessed to his role in the murder, but was
released from custody when the DPP decided not to prosecute."'
Certain facts suggest that police may have been involved in
Rosemary Nelson's murder as well. In addition to allegedly receiving
death threats from the RUC,36 Nelson had an unusually high security
presence outside of her house the night before the bomb went off,
leading some to wonder how the attackers planted the bomb."
Immediately after the murder, the RUC Chief Constable announced
the involvement of the Chief Constable of Kent and the FBI in the
any of the allegations).
128. See David McKittrick, 'RUC Informer Killed Finucane,' Independent
(London), June 25, 1999, at 4 [hereinafter McKittrick, RUC Infornier].
129. See id. The accused, Mr. William Stobie, pleaded not guilty, and his response
to the charge was read in Belfast Magistrate's Court: "'At the time I was a police
informer for Special Branch and on the night of the death of Pat Finucane I informed
Special Branch on two occasions by telephone that a person was to be shot.'" Id.
Stobie claimed he did not know who was to be shot. See id.
130. See Committee on the Administration of Justice, notes taken at Stobie Bail
Application hearing, Aug. 3, 1999 (on file with Fordhain Law Review).
131. See Committee on the Administration of Justice, Additional Submission to the




135. See id.; see also McKittrick, RUC Informer, supra note 128 (stating that
Stobie's solicitor told the court that the police and the DPP likely had access to the
information about the murder for some time).
136. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
137. See Clarke, supra note 5 (explaining further the possibility that an officer or
soldier could have alerted the bombers to Nelson's presence, and that her car was
parked in the driveway).
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Nelson investigation, giving the inquiry "added independence."'3
However, the FBI had no authority to investigate, could not issue
search warrants, and its role in the investigation concluded only a few
months after the murder. 39  Currently, the Norfolk Deputy Chief
Constable heads the investigation with a team of both English and
RUC officers.14 The RUC officers reportedly are not investigating
the collusion allegations.14' However, because the Deputy Chief
Constable must still report directly to the RUC Chief Constable, and
the investigators from outside Northern Ireland work out of the RUC
station in Nelson's home town, those with information may be less
inclined to come forward. 42
The circumstances surrounding Finucane's and Nelson's deaths
have led many human rights organizations to call for independent
inquiries into both murders. 43 The lack of substantive inquiry by the
RUC into either murder illustrates the serious need for a separate,
independent mechanism to identify the guilty and hold them
accountable.
4. Complaints
Many defense solicitors do not lodge harassment complaints
because they have little faith that their complaints will be handled
effectively. 1" The role of the Independent Commission for Police
138. David McKittrick, RUC Acts to Quell Collusion Rumours, Independent
(London), Mar. 17, 1999, at 6; see also Toby Harnden, RUC Calls in Kent Police and
FBI, Daily Telegraph (London), Mar. 17, 1999, at 1 (announcing that Nelson's murder
investigation would be conducted by the Kent police with the assistance of the FBI).
139. See Joe Carroll, FBI's Role in Nelson Inquiry Has Concluded-Spokesman,
Irish Times, May 24, 1999, at 7; Rachel Donnelly, FBI No Longer Active in Nelson
Murder Inquiry, Irish Times, May 27, 1999, at 8. Recently, a suspect was arrested in
the United States to be questioned about Nelson's murder. See Nelson Bomb Suspect
Arrested, supra note 5.
140. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Northern Ireland Update, supra
note 127, at 6.
141. See id.
142. See id. (explaining that people with information that would be potentially
useful to the investigation may not come forward because of the apparent RUC
involvement in the investigation). Recently, the investigating force arrested a loyalist
paramilitary member and former British soldier, who was not charged with Nelson's
murder but was arraigned on weapons charges. See Warren Hoge, Northern Ireland:
Ex-Soldier Held, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18,2000, at A5.
143. See Clare Murphy, Callfor New Nelson Inquiry, Irish Times, Dec. 11, 1999, at
8; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, For an Independent Inquiry into the
Killing of a Human Rights Defender, Rosemary Nelson, Joint Statement by Amnesty
International, British/Irish Rights Watch, Committee on the Administration of
Justice, Human Rights Watch, Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of
the International Commission of Jurists, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1999) <http://www.lchr.org/n.ireland/nijoint.htm> [hereinafter Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Joint Statement].
144. See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 102; see also
McKittrick, Ulster Lawyers 'Threatened by RUC', supra note 109 (stating that only a
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Complaints ("ICPC")145 is merely to supervise the investigation of
complaints, while the police have the role of actual investigation.'1
The ICPC can impose certain requirements regarding how the
investigation is conducted, but is never directly involved in the
investigation itself. 47 Therefore, the police are effectively left alone
to investigate themselves.
Upon completion of a complaint investigation, the investigating
RUC officer sends a report to the ICPC and a copy to the Chief
Constable."4 The supervising officer at the ICPC determines whether
the investigation has been satisfactorily conducted and submits a
statement to both the Chief Constable and the complainant. 4 9 The
Chief Constable then decides whether the report indicates that an
officer has committed an offense, and if so, the Chief Constable must
send a copy of the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP), who decides whether to prosecute." In an exceptional case,
the DPP may independently bring criminal charges against an officer
even though the ICPC has not issued a statement, but the
investigation is still conducted by the RUC.'' Arguably, the RUC
will not attempt to investigate its own officers as thoroughly as it
would another party. Because only the RUC has the power to
investigate,1 52 one can understand why solicitors have little faith in this
system.
The complainant can do little to initiate criminal proceedings if the
investigator's report is not sent to the DPP or if the DPP decides not
to prosecute.153 The complainant can request that the DPP reconsider
prosecution, but the DPP legally does not have to give reasons for his
or her decisions, and rarely does so, which makes it "virtually
impossible to mount a legal challenge."'"
few solicitors have voiced complaints but there have been allegations for more than a
decade).
145. See The Independent Commission for Police Complaints for Northern Ireland,
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? The Independent Commission for Police Complaints
for Northern Ireland, 39 N. Ir. Legal Q. 185, 185-88 (1988) (describing procedures of
the ICPC).
146. See Brice Dickson, ComplainLts Against the Police, in Civil Liberties in
Northern Ireland: The C.A.J. Handbook 80, 83-86 (Brice Dickson ed., 3d ed. 1997)
(providing a detailed description of the complaints process and the involvement of the
ICPC).
147. For example, the ICPC can require that "'the investigation be provided with
additional staff and resources, that particular persons be interviewed or that certain
forensic evidence be sought." Id. at 85.
148. See id
149. See id
150. See id at 86.
151. See id.
152 See id. at 83.
153. See id. at 87.
154. Id. Even through judicial review, the complainant would have to show -very
convincing evidence of a criminal offence" before a judge would overrule the DPP's
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The RUC is 92% Protestant and is itself victimized by paramilitary
attacks. 55 Many solicitors, therefore, are understandably skeptical
about the quality of a police investigation into a complaint that
appears to come from the Catholic/nationalist side of the conflict.1 6
Moreover, the RUC simply does not handle the complaints
effectively. Several solicitors told the Lawyers Committee that the
complaints they lodged went nowhere.'57  Even though an
independent mechanism exists in the ICPC, it never becomes directly
involved in the process of the investigation, 158 and statistics show that
very few officers are disciplined despite the high number of cases
(brought both by the general public and solicitors) that come before
the ICPC.'59
Rosemary Nelson lodged complaints against the RUC, alleging that
she was both verbally and physically abused by the police on several
occasions.)6  The Supervising Member of the ICPC made an
unprecedented move when she concluded that the RUC's
investigation into the complaints was unsatisfactory. 6' A Commander
decision. Id. A private prosecution is expensive, and the DPP may still overtake and
terminate private prosecutions. See id.
155. Nearly 9000 police officers have been wounded in the last 30 years, mostly by
the IRA, and more than 300 have been killed. See 60 Minutes, supra note 108, at 14-
15.
156. See Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 104.
157. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and Legal
Defense, supra note 2, at 40.
158. See Dickson, supra note 146, at 84.
159. In 1992, the substantiation rate for complaints in Northern Ireland was 4.3%,
while in England and Wales it was 27.9%. See Brice Dickson & Robert Millar,
Complaints Against the Police, in Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland: The C.A.J.
Handbook 76, 89 (Brice Dickson ed., 2d ed. 1993). From 1989-1992, 16.9% of cases
the ICPC considered came from people arrested under the EPA or PTA. See id. at 90.
Of those cases, 56.5% alleged assault during an interview by police, and another 5.3%
alleged assault before arriving at the station. See id. Not one of these complaints was
substantiated by the ICPC. The reasons given for this were the complainant's refusal
to cooperate with the investigation and "'insufficient evidence."' Id.
The situation does not appear to be improving. From 1997 to 1999, 5293
complaints against the police were referred to the ICPC, only 61 of which were
substantiated. See RUC, Complaint Statistics: Table 3 (initially recorded 1997198, and
1998/99) <http://www.ruc.police.uk/press/statistics/complaints.htm>. Of these, 1997
were complaints of assault, and 6 were substantiated. See id. Of the 544 "oppressive
conduct/harassment" complaints, none were substantiated. Id.
160. See Nelson, Congressional Testimony, supra note 109.
161. See Kieran McEvoy, Chronology of Events, Just News, (Bull. Comm. on
Admin. of Just., Belfast, Northern Ireland), Mar. 1999, vol. 14, no.3, at 2-3. In a
summary of the ICPC report that was publicly released, the Supervising Member
criticized "RUC hostility to Rosemary, lack of professionalism including one officer
who turned up 45 minutes late for a meeting smelling of alcohol, officers being
assisted in the preparation of their statements by the investigating chief inspector who
also made judgements as to the moral character of Rosemary Nelson" and an overall
borderline obstructive mindset. Id. In response, the RUC has attempted to
personalize the report by focusing on its author, calling her conclusions "subjective."
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Joint Statement, supra note 143; Clare
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of the Metropolitan Police (not an RUC officer) undertook a second
investigation and issued a review of the RUC's handling of the
original investigation, concluding that there was insufficient evidence
to prosecute any officer.162 However, in a private report, the ICPC
Chairperson criticized the Metropolitan Police for not conducting a
thorough or impartial review. 63 The DPP ultimately decided not to
take action against any RUC officers. 64 Rosemary Nelson's case
illustrates the need for an accountable independent official to inquire
officially into police misconduct.
C. International Standards Regarding the Role of Attorneys
Lawyers around the world face abuses similar to those in Northern
Ireland. As a result, the international community has developed
standards that governments are expected to abide by to ensure that
the rights of their citizens are protected. Several international human
rights standards specifically address the position lawyers hold in
society, and highlight the importance of lawyers being able to do their
job effectively. 165 Furthermore, these standards create a structure for
the protection of lawyers in society. The United Nations Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers," the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders,167 and the 1998 Report of the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers" s are
examples of the attention that the international community has
focused on this problem.
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers"
resulted from a coordinated effort to create "international standards
for the independence of the bench and bar."'70 The Basic Principles
Murphy, Commission Reports Rising Trend in RUC Complaints, Irish Tunes, Mar. 19,
1999, at 9.
162. See Kearney, supra note 102. In the published summary, matters related to
disciplinary or criminal breaches by the RUC were omitted. See McEvoy, supra note
161.
163. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Joint Statement, supra note 143.
164. See Moriarty, supra note 110.
165. See generally The United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 8th Cong. on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/2B (1990) [hereinafter Basic Principles]
(discussing the role of lawyers and guarantees for their functioning in the arena of
international human rights law); Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. GAOR. 53rd Sess.,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/53/144 (1998) [hereinafter Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders] (recognizing the responsibility of individuals, groups and associations to
protect human rights).
166. See Basic Principles, supra note 165.
167. See Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, supra note 165.
168. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 89.
169. See Basic Principles, supra note 165.
170. Martin S. Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in
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are not a legally binding international treaty, but they do reveal a
consensus on the part of the international community. 7' In addition,
they arguably also operate as a source of customary international law,
which means that the standard results from "a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."'72
Many nations have adopted codes governing lawyers' conduct to
ensure that they are able to represent clients effectively.13 The Basic
Principles themselves encourage a sense of legal obligation by stating
that governments should respect and consider the Principles "within
the framework of their national legislation and practice.' ' 74
The Basic Principles address many issues, including access to
lawyers and legal services (1-4), qualifications and training (9-11),
duties and responsibilities (12-15), freedom of expression and
association (23), professional associations (24-25), and disciplinary
proceedings (26-29). 1  In addition, the Principles discuss special
safeguards in criminal justice matters. They provide that governments
should ensure that detainees are informed about their right to a
lawyer of their own choice upon arrest or detention, 76 that they be
provided with adequate opportunities to communicate with a lawyer
in full confidentiality,"7 and that they be given prompt access to a
lawyer not later than forty-eight hours from the time of arrest. 17 8
Significantly, one section of the Basic Principles addresses
guarantees for the safe and effective functioning of lawyers. Principle
16(a) states, "Governments shall ensure that lawyers are able to
perform all of their professional functions without intimidation,
hindrance, harassment or improper interference .... ,19 Furthermore,
"[w]here the security of lawyers is threatened as a result of
discharging their functions, they shall be adequately safeguarded by
the authorities""18 and "[l]awyers shall not be identified with their
Northern Ireland, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty,
Interrogation in Northern Ireland] (citing Reed Brody, Introduction to The Centre for
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, The Independence of Judges and Lawyers:
A Compilation of International Standards 3-13 (Reed Brody ed., 1990)); Human
Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 91.
171. See Flaherty, Interrogation in Northern Ireland, supra note 170, at 14.
172. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
102(2) (1987). These constitute the two requirements a standard must meet to be a
source of customary international law-"generality" and opinio juris. See id. at cmts.
b&c.
173. For examples of such codes, including those in New York, England and Wales,
and China, and for constitutional provisions showing a commitment to effective
counsel, see Flaherty, Human Rights Violations, supra note 5, at 90 & n.10.
174. Basic Principles, supra note 165, Preamble.
175. See id.
176. See id. 5.
177. See id. 8.
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clients or their clients' causes as a result of discharging their
functions." '181 Evidence of the present situation of lawyers in Northern
Ireland strongly suggests that the Government is in violation of these
principles.
In 1998, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders as a response to the need for recognition of human
rights defenders whose rights are often violated by governments."-
Similar to the Basic Principles, the Declaration is not a legally binding
treaty, but indicates agreement within the international community
and arguably is evidence of customary international law. The
Declaration states generally that everyone has the right to strive for
protection of human rights (Article 1), and that the State should
ensure that the rights in the Declaration are guaranteed (Article
2(2)).183 Furthermore, individuals have a right to be protected in the
event of violations of these rights, to complain, and to have an
independent review of their complaint (Article 9). The Declaration
indicates that the State shall conduct the independent investigation
where a violation is believed to have occurred (Article (5)), and it
shall create independent national institutions to protect human rights,
such as ombudsmen or human rights commissions (Article 14(3)).
The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders provides an example of
the international scrutiny and importance bestowed on the role of
human rights defenders, including criminal defense lawyers, in
safeguarding citizens' procedural rights.
Pursuant to a 1994 Commission on Human Rights resolution," the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges
and lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, undertook a fact-finding
mission to Northern Ireland in October 19971 His primary purpose
was to investigate the reports of systematic abuse of defense lawyers
in Northern Ireland by police, and to examine provisions, such as the
emergency laws, that raised concerns of restriction of access to legal
advice." 6 As stated in his mission report, Cumaraswamy found that
"the RUC has engaged in activities which constitute intimidation,
hindrance, harassment, or improper interference" and expressed
particular concern that police had identified solicitors with their
clients' causes." When voicing his concerns, the Special Rapporteur
directly mentioned that several of the United Nations Basic Principles
181. Id. 18.
182. See Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, supra note 165.
183. See id.
184. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 89, 1.
185. In the course of his mission, the Special Rapporteur visited detention centers,
met with government representatives, police, non-governmental organizations,
solicitors, and barristers who provided testimony of their harassment. See id. 7-9.




on the Role of Lawyers were potentially being violated. 88
As a result, the Special Rapporteur made a number of
recommendations, including that an independent investigation into
threats of legal counsel be conducted, that the Government provide
necessary protection to lawyers and investigate threats, that lawyers
lodge formal complaints with authorities, and that the RUC organize
training seminars for police that would address the role defense
lawyers play in the justice system. 8 9 The Special Rapporteur further
urged the Government to conduct an immediate independent judicial
inquiry into Patrick Finucane's murder.190  In addressing the
emergency legislation, the Special Rapporteur advocated
reinstatement of the right to silence and the right to trial by jury, and
urged that implementation of the ordinary criminal law be given
priority.19'
As these standards and findings indicate, the international
community has recognized the need to protect lawyers and their
clients from official abuses, and they legitimize the theory that, as a
matter of customary international law, the British government has a
responsibility to provide safeguards to solicitors and to encourage
effective legal representation. The next part focuses on the
Independent Commission on Policing and its recent Report aimed at
assessing policing problems in Northern Ireland and suggesting
solutions. Significantly changing the way the police currently operate
in Northern Ireland could potentially alter the situation for defense
lawyers, because many of the problems lawyers face stem directly
from policing practices. The next part presents the contents of the
Policing Report to provide a context for analyzing whether the
Policing Commission's proposals can positively change the
environment of intimidation for defense lawyers in Northern Ireland.
II. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING IN NORTHERN
IRELAND AND ITS FINDINGS
The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland
("Policing Commission") was established under the April 10, 1998,
Agreement.' g2 Its purpose was to review policing and to make
recommendations regarding future policing structures and
arrangements in Northern Ireland. 93 On September 9, 1999, the
Policing Commission published its report, which includes
recommendations for a human rights-based approach to policing,
mechanisms to increase police accountability, and suggestions for
188. See id. 23-25, 41-42, 45, 52, 73-74.
189. See id. 91.
190. See id. 95.
191. See id. 95 (a), (b) & (c).
192. See Agreement, supra note 19, at Policing and Justice, T 3.
193. See id. at Annex A.
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changing the composition of the force to make it more representative
of the community.1" This part describes the organization and
operation of the Policing Commission, and presents its findings and
recommendations in addition to some criticisms of those proposals.
A. The Operation and Organization of the Policing Commission
1. Why was the Commission Organized?
The preamble to the Agreement lists its main purposes, one of
which is "commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means
of resolving differences on political issues, and [ ] opposition to any
use or threat of force by others for any political purpose."'19 As part
of this transition to a peaceful society, the Policing Commission was
created under the Agreement to recommend ways in which the police
force could be changed to increase community support for policing. t1
In the introduction to its Report, the Policing Commission states that
"policing is at the heart of many of the problems that politicians have
been unable to resolve in Northern Ireland."'" Indeed, Northern
Ireland's divided society puts pressure on the police, whose responses
to the conflict have heightened tensions rather than abated them.1'
The historic religious and political disproportionality of the police
force causes identification of police with the state, affecting the "sense
of security and identity of both communities" and undermining the
effectiveness of police enforcement."' Addressing and debating these
controversial topics is a key step toward ultimately achieving the
"democratic and peaceful" aims of the Agreement.
The violence of the last thirty years created a police force that
operates out of highly fortified stations resembling military buildings,
whose members drive armored vehicles and at times of extreme
conflict, wear flak jackets, drive land rovers, and are accompanied by
armed soldiers.2' Police officers face incredible dangers on the job,
and over 300 officers have been killed since the Troubles began, while
thousands more have been injured or psychologically scarred.2al
Police officers fear that certain geographical areas are traps in which
paramilitaries will ambush them when they are called in for aid.21 As
a result, police admittedly do not carry out "normal" policing in all
194. See generally Policing Report, supra note 21, at ch. 20 (summarizing
recommendations).
195. Agreement, supra note 19, at Declaration of Support, '1 4.
196. See id at Strand One, Annex A.
197. Policing Report, supra note 21, 11.2.
198. See Linda Moore, supra note 16, at 1578-79 (1999).
199. Policing Report, supra note 21, 1 1.3.
200. See Moore, supra note 16, at 1579.
201. See supra note 155.
202. See Human Rights Watch, To Serve Without Favor, supra note 14, at 102.
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parts of the country, thereby creating barriers between the police and
the community.23 The RUC argues that it wishes to be a community
force,204 but community support is impossible when a system exists in
which paramilitaries carry out justice on their own terms and when
many believe that the police do little to combat it.2°5
In contrast to the current state of tension, the Agreement seeks a
police force "that can enjoy widespread support from, and is seen as
an integral part of, the community as a whole. 2 °6 The police and
politics have unfortunately been linked for the last thirty years in
Northern Ireland, so that the current attempts at political reform
necessitate an inquiry into policing reforms.2 0°  As the Policing
Commission states, "If the fresh start for politics founders, it will be
more difficult to make changes in policing; and if changes in policing
are resisted (or mishandled) then there could be a serious impact on
the attempt to rebuild democratic politics in Northern Ireland. 2°8
Hence, changes in policing bear a close relationship to the success of
the Agreement and the ultimate prospects for peace in Northern
Ireland.
2. Tasks of the Commission
The "Policing and Justice" section of the Agreement reiterates that
the Agreement provides "the opportunity for a new beginning to
policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting
and sustaining support from the community as a whole. ' 29  The
Agreement further stresses that the police service must be impartial,
203. See id. One RUC source stated that attacks on police officers had resulted in
police either not responding in certain areas or on occasion not responding as quickly
as either they, or the public, would like. See id. Another source indicated that "the
terrorist threat has inhibited the degree and quality of contact between the Police and
the public and, at times and in places, the nature of the Police response to community
needs." Id. at 102-03 (citing to Address of Hugh Annesley, former RUC Chief
Constable, to the Armagh Diocesan Synod, Oct. 22, 1991, p. 5).
204. See id. at 104 (citing to Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interview with Chief
Constable Ronnie Flanagan in Belfast, Nov. 24, 1996).
205. See id. at 102-07.
206. Agreement, supra note 19, at Policing and Justice, Annex A.
207. Pat Fahy, an attorney who has received threats, many allegedly from the
police, stated:
There is such a level of distrust ... that... cannot be overestimated among
the Catholic nationalist people towards the RUC. I believe that upwards of
100 percent of Catholic people will believe that there has been collusion
between the RUC and loyalist paramilitaries in the killing of Catholic
people. Now, whether that's right or wrong, if that perception is held by so
many people, clearly there's a very, very serious problem.
60 Minutes, supra note 108, at 17.
208. Policing Report, supra note 21, 1 1.7; see also Linda Moore, supra note 16, at
1581 (stating that "[f]or many, the future of the RUC remains a distillation of the
Northern Ireland question, reflecting the obvious centrality of the issue to a society
where the state itself has been at the center of political contention").
209. Agreement, supra note 19, at Policing and Justice, 1.
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accountable, professional, and effective in its response to crime and
terrorist threats, because anything less will fail to gain public
acceptance or confidence.10
Within this general framework, Annex A to the Agreement lays out
specific tasks for the Policing Commission. Initially, the Commission
was to conduct an inquiry into the present state of policing and then
make its proposals regarding future policing structures and
arrangements.2 1' Although the Commission's focus was on policing, it
could draw the Government's attention to other aspects of the
criminal justice system relevant to its policing work, including the role
of police in prosecution.212 The Commission was encouraged to
establish focus groups, consult non-governmental organizations, and
to generally interview a broad range of people.23
The Agreement also provides that the police service must operate
within a "coherent and cooperative criminal justice system, which
conforms with human rights norms."2 '4  In furtherance of this
principle, a government-led Criminal Justice Review was created to
propose future criminal justice arrangements other than those related
to policing and emergency legislation.25 This review was scheduled to
report just after the Policing Commission, theoretically allowing the
Criminal Justice Review to pick up on issues that the Policing
Commission excluded. One commentator criticized the establishment
of these two groups as creating an "artificial division," because many
issues overlap between the Policing Commission and the Criminal
Justice Commission, yet there is no mechanism in the Agreement for
cooperation between the two groups.216 The Agreement also remains
vague as to whether the Policing Commission may consider the
continued vitality of emergency legislation, an issue that is closely tied
to policing in Northern Ireland.1 7
3. The Process of the Commission and its Findings
On June 3, 1998, the Commission was established, and the Secretary
of State announced its membership. Former Governor of Hong Kong
210. See id T 2.
211. The arrangements include composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos
and symbols, and the Commission's recommendations could also cover re-training.




215. See id at Annex B. The Criminal Justice Review will make arrangements
regarding judicial appointments, supervision of the prosecution process, measures to
improve the responsibility and accountability of the criminal justice s)stem,
cooperation between north and south, and devolution of criminal justice functions to
an Assembly. See id
216. Moore, supra note 16, at 1587.
217. See id at 1587-89.
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Christopher Patten chaired the Commission. Of the seven remaining
members of the Commission, two had experience in policing, one
represented the nationalist community and one the unionist
community, two were academics, and one was a senior business
figure. 18 On June 11th and 12th, 1998, the Commission held its first
meeting, and began by briefing itself on the background to the
Agreement and the establishment of the Commission, on the present
policing arrangements in Northern Ireland, on previous reports on
policing in Northern Ireland, and on worldwide debates and
developments concerning policing.219 The Commission invited the
public to submit their opinions on policing, and letters were sent to
those with a particular interest in the subject." The Commission held
both private and public meetings over the next several months, and
held open meetings in every District Council area in Northern
Ireland.aa1
More than 10,000 people attended the public meetings and over
1000 spoke a. 2  The Commission received approximately 2500 written
submissions, a number of petitions signed by several thousand people,
and some standardized letters, all of which were read by the
Commissioners. 2  Private meetings continued, and consultants
formed eight focus groups from different citizen traditions and
backgrounds for study. 4  Other consultants performed a cultural
audit of the police with the cooperation of the RUC.21 The
218. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 2.1; Moore, supra note 16, at 1591-92.
The other members were: Dr. Maurice Hayes, Irish Senator and previously Northern
Ireland Ombudsman and Permanent Secretary in the Northern Ireland Department
of Health and Social Services; Dr. Gerald Lynch, President of John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, New York; Kathleen O'Toole, a career police officer, previously
Massachusetts Secretary for Public Safety, currently an administrator at Boston
College; Prof. Clifford Shearing, Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the
University of Toronto and a Professor within the School of Government at the
University of the Western Cape; Sir John Smith, former Deputy Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police and a former Inspector of Constabulary; Mr. Peter Smith, QC, a
barrister practicing in Northern Ireland, and Mrs. Lucy Woods, former Chief
Executive of British Telecom in Northern Ireland and BT Ireland. See Policing
Report, supra note 21, 2.1.
219. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 2.3.
220. See id. Those with a particular interest included political parties, churches,
and non-governmental organizations. See id.
221. Paragraph 2.3 of the Policing Report describes those with whom the
Commission met, which include politicians, civil liberties groups, community and
youth workers, and academics. They also visited several police stations and met with
individual police officers. See Annex 3 to the Policing Report, supra note 21, for a list
of meetings conducted in November and December, when the main program of
meetings was conducted.
222. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 2.3.
223. See id.
224. See id. The groups consisted of people from both Protestant/unionist and
Catholic/nationalist communities, and included both higher and lower income groups.
See id. 3.18-3.20.
225. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 2.3.
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Commission conducted a survey of public attitudes to policing in the
spring of 1999, and it visited police services in the Republic of Ireland,
Great Britain, Canada, South Africa, Spain, and the United States." 6
Finally, the Commission attended policing conferences, human rights
conferences, and visited the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.'
To provide a basis of comparison for its own findings, the Policing
Commission reviewed the findings of public opinion surveys about the
RUC. Overall, the poll findings indicated a high satisfaction rate with
policing in Northern Ireland. 8  But surveys also showed that
perceptions of policing between Protestant and Catholic communities
varied greatly, which highlights the problem of policing in a divided
society.2 9 Catholics showed a higher satisfaction rate with local police
than with the performance of the police as a whole, and the opposite
held true for Protestants,' 3 reflecting how communities feel about the
RUC as an institution.231 Significantly more Catholic respondents than
Protestants found that the RUC treats the two communities
unequally. 2 Catholic lower-class communities held the most negative
view about whether the police treated people fairly in their local area,
and significantly fewer Catholics in lower-working-class areas than
Protestants of the same socioeconomic status thought the police
treated people equally in the country as a whole."3 About 75% of
Catholics thought there were too few Catholics in the police force, as
compared with 60% of Protestants. '  Seventy percent of Catholics
stated that Catholics were deterred from entering the force mainly
226. For a list of all of the police services consulted, see Annex 4 to the Policing
Report, supra note 21.
227. See id. 2.3.
228. See id 3.2. According to the International Crime Victimisation Survey,
which covers eleven Western countries, public satisfaction with police performance
was higher in Northern Ireland than all the continental European countries polled,
and lower only than Canada, the United States, Scotland, and England and Wales,
most of which were consulted by the Policing Commission during its investigation. See
id Four Omnibus Surveys carried out by the Northern Ireland Statistics and
Research Agency found high approval ratings of police performance in Northern
Ireland as a whole. See id. 9 3.3.
229. See id- 3.4. (discussing results of Omnibus Surveys showing an over 80%
Protestant approval rate as compared with a 50% Catholic approval rate).
230. See id. 3.5.
231. See id. The Commission stated:
For a significant number of Protestants, support for the RUC as an
institution may be expressed more strongly than satisfaction with the
delivery of the local police service; while for some Catholics the local police
service may be satisfactory even if they have misgivings about the wider role
of the police or about the RUC as an institution.
Id.
232. See id 3.7. According to Omnibus Surveys, about 70% of Protestants
thought that the police treat the communities equally, as compared to 25-30% of
Catholics. Both communities gave higher ratings to their local police, but there still
was a significant difference between them. See id. T19 3.7, 3.8.
233. See id- 1 3.8 (citing a Queen's University, Belfast, survey).
234. See id. T 3.11.
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because of intimidation or fear of attack, while 30% said it was
because potential Catholic members did not support the
governmental system. 5 About half of both communities indicated
that there should be more women in the force.236
The results of the Policing Commission's public consultations were
"broadly similar to findings of the earlier polls." 7 In accordance with
the previous surveys, the Commission's findings revealed that
"beneath the moderately satisfactory overall popular approval of
policing in Northern Ireland lay a sharp difference between
Protestant/Unionist perceptions of the police and Catholic/Nationalist
views."" These differences were most pronounced in the public
meetings, where participants expressed strong support for the RUC in
meetings held in Protestant/unionist areas, strong criticism in
Catholic/nationalist areas, and mixed views at mixed meetings. 9
Significantly, the Policing Commission found a "commonality of
interest" in policing between the Catholic/nationalist and
Protestant/unionist communities as their research progressed. 4
Majorities in both communities expressed a desire for the police to
maintain order and protect their rights. To this end, citizens wanted
more neighborhood patrolling, a less-militarized police force with less
weaponry and smaller patrols, less-imposing police stations, and fewer
armored cars.24'
Overall, the Commission heard general concerns about policing that
would likely be expressed in most countries, but also found that many
of the problems that police face in Northern Ireland result from the
divided nature of the society. Generally, citizens of Northern Ireland
believe that the police force should be more representative of the
community, particularly with regard to women and Catholics on the
force.242 Most people were open to these types of changes in the
police, in the interests of more effective and efficient policing.243
B. Recommendations of the Policing Commission
1. Human Rights
The Policing Report was published on September 9, 1999. In it, the
Policing Commission declares that a "central proposition" of the
235. See id. (citing Community Attitudes Survey).





241. See id. 13.18.
242. See id. 3.23. The Commission noted that there were "differences of
emphasis" on this point in different communities. Id.
243. See id. 3.22.
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Report is "that the fundamental purpose of policing should be, in the
words of the Agreement [of April 1998], the protection and
vindication of the human rights of all." 2" The Commission further
quotes Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which reads, "everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be
fully realised,"245 and states that the police must help achieve that
social and international order.2' Finally, the Commission states that
"[u]pholding human rights and upholding the law should be one and
the same thing."'247
The Commission thereby places great emphasis on raising human
rights awareness in police practice in Northern Ireland. The
Commission found that the RUC was only beginning to consider how
to address human rights issues, and only in the particular context of
the Human Rights Act 1998.218 The RUC's recently introduced
training curriculum249 focuses overwhelmingly on drill and firearms
training as opposed to human rights. The Policing Commission
instead recommends "a comprehensive programme of action to focus
policing in Northern Ireland on a human rights-based approach,"
which "should be seen as the core of [the] report."' The purpose of
this program is to ensure respect for human rights both technically
and behaviorally. Technically, police will be less likely to use
unethical methods in policing if they know the laws well and master
policing skills. Behaviorally, respect for human rights should be an
instinctual reaction rather than a procedural point to remember."'
To further this human rights goal, the Commission makes specific
recommendations for a new Code of Ethics that integrates the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into police
practice,252 revamped codes of practice that are in accordance with the
244. Id. 4.1; see also Agreement, supra note 19, at Declaration of Support, 2
(emphasizing the same goal).
245. Policing Report, supra note 21, 4.1 (quoting Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 10,1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg.,
art. 28(2), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
246. See id T 4.1.
247. Id. 4.3.
248. See id. 4.5. The rights discussed in the European Convention of Human
Rights are given direct effect in United Kingdom courts via the passage of the Human
Rights Act 1998, and when the Act becomes effective in the Year 2000, United
Kingdom courts will more actively ensure compliance with international human rights
standards. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Police have begun to
consider the implications of the Act in specific areas that may be affected, particularly
in pre-trial procedures, custody of arrested persons, covert policing, and emergency
planning. See Policing Report, supra note 21, T 4.5, box 1.
249. This curriculum is brand-new and was introduced in 1999. See Policing Report,
supra note 21, T 4.5.
250. Id. 4.6 (emphasis omitted).
251. See id. 4.13.
252. See id. 4.8. The Commission recommends that a good model would be the
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ECHR,2 3 and training of police officers and civilians in the
fundamental principles and standards of human rights, including the
practical implications for policing.' Furthermore, the Commission
advocates awareness of human rights issues and respect for human
rights as important elements in appraising individual performance in
the police service,25 the appointment of a human rights lawyer to the
staff of the police legal services, 2 6 and monitoring by the Policing
Board of the respect afforded to human rights by the police. 7
2. Accountability
The Policing Commission argues that effective policing requires
consent from the community, which will come only when the police
are held accountable both in a "subordinate" sense and in a
"cooperative" sense. 8 In Northern Ireland, accountability has not
occurred in either of these ways because of significant problems with
democratic accountability, transparency, legal accountability, and
internal accountability. 9 The Report therefore addresses each of
these issues.
In Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State both appoints members
to the Police Authority, a body that monitors police performance, and
has the power to remove them.260 The police therefore cannot be held
accountable by the public through democratically elected officials.
Political parties and trade unions refuse to allow their members to be
appointed to the Authority and therefore exacerbate the problem of
creating representative membership.261 Further, Northern Ireland
1992 draft Code by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). See id. at Annex
5 (reproducing the 1992 draft of the Code of Ethics).
253. See id. 4.8.
254. See id. 4.9.
255. See id. 4.10.
256. See id. 4.11.
257. See id. 4.12. See infra notes 283-300 and accompanying text for a description
of the Policing Board.
258. See Policing Report, supra note 21, $[ 5.2. Police are subordinate in that they
are employed by the community to provide a service, and they are subordinate to the
law like any other citizen. In a cooperative sense, police and the community must
work together and communicate in a partnership to achieve effective policing. See id.
1 5.3.
259. See id. 5.4. Through democratic accountability, elected representatives
inform the police of what they would like from the service, and hold the police
accountable for delivering their wishes. Transparency keeps the community informed
and allows its members to question police actions. Legal accountability assures that
the police are held to account for misuse of powers. See id. $$ 5.4, 5.5.
260. See id. 5.5; see also Brice Dickson, The Police Authority for Northern
Ireland, 39 N. Ir. Legal Q. 277, 277-78 (1988) [hereinafter Dickson, The Police
Authority] (discussing necessary changes, including increased accountability, for
efficient law enforcement in Northern Ireland).
261. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 5.5. Many nationalist groups refuse to
nominate representatives for the Authority because they say that "they cannot
nominate members for a body which, in their opinion, has not done enough to curb
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police "serv[e] two masters," which creates a tendency for police to
develop a more direct relationship with the more influential one.26-
The Chief Constable reports to the Secretary of State for security-
related policing issues, and to the Authority for ordinary crime
policing.263 The Secretary of State maintains direct ties with the Chief
Constable, has influence through the appointment of the Police
Authority, and also determines the budget.264 The Secretary of State
must answer to Parliament as a democratically elected minister, but he
or she is never a Northern Ireland political party member and
therefore is not elected by the people of Northern Ireland.h Because
of these relationships, many people view the police as an "instrument
of British government policy rather than a service meeting local
priorities."'6
The Police Authority may require reports about police activity from
the Chief Constable when it believes the report would be in the public
interest, but doubt exists as to whether this obligation includes
reporting on operational matters.' Under the Police (Northern
Ireland) Act 1998, if the Chief Constable does not believe a report is
in the public interest or necessary to the functioning of the Police
Authority, he or she may request that the Authority look to the
Secretary of State for a decision on whether the report should be
produced. s The Authority also has no powers of inquiry and thus
cannot follow up on a report that is issued.269
Limitations on the powers of the Police Authority and the public's
perceptions of the Authority further limit its effectiveness and weaken
its democratic accountability.7- The Secretary of State has significant
power over the Authority, for she or he may set objectives that must
be considered, the Police Authority and Chief Constable must consult
her or him during planning, and she or he can direct the Chief
police excesses or introduce progressive policing policies." Dickson, The Police
Authority, supra note 260, at 279.
262. Policing Report, supra note 21, 1 5.6.
263. See id.
264. See id. 5.7.
265. See id.
266. Id 5.9. Many feel that the outbreak of the Troubles was largely due to the
fact that, prior to 1969, the RUC was under the direction of the former Unionist
government. Separation between police and state is therefore a key issue in
establishing accountability. See id.
267. See id. 1 5.10. Generally, this power has rarely, if ever, been exercised. See
Dickson, The Legal System, supra note 31, at 254. The Police Authority is not meant
to interfere with the way the police perform their jobs, because the Chief Constable
has sole responsibility for operational matters and directs and controls the force.
However, the term "operational matters" is ill-defined, so it is difficult to say on what
matters the police should report. See id. at 254; infra notes 296-99 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the term "operational independence."
268. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 9 5.10.
269. See id.
270. See id. 5.11, 5.12.
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Constable over the head of the Police Authority.7 ' Additionally,
people perceive the Police Authority to be pro-police, as evidenced by
its quick defense of allegations of police wrongdoing before they have
been properly investigated.72 Recent attempts have been made to
separate the functions of the Police Authority and the police force, 73
but in the words of the Policing Commission, "the relationship
between the two bodies is still in some respects that between
executive collaborators rather than one between a service provider
and a regulator. 274
For members of the public to gain confidence in their police force,
they need to know what the police are doing and why. Past
arrangements have not made police activities transparent because the
Police Authority does not meet in public and some of the names of its
members are not even publicly available. 275  Although many local
Community and Police Liaison Committees exist, the public does not
typically see senior officers reporting and answering the public's
questions.276 The police themselves view this as a problem of public
relations, but their response to inquiries is defensive.277 The Policing
Commission argues that the police must instead expand
communications with the media and willingly provide the public with
information about their work to create a feeling of openness and
transparency.278
The police force, like all citizens, must act within the bounds of the
law at all times. To facilitate legal accountability, the Commission
believes that police should know the law and their powers under it, be
monitored and punished for any abuses, and that the public should see
this process of accountability occurring. 279 Procedures that secure
compliance with the law and international human rights standards,
and an effective complaints system, will instill confidence in the public
as well as protect officers from malicious complaints. 80  The
Commission has "no doubt" that some RUC officers in the past have
271. See id. T 5.11.
272. See id. 91 5.12.
273. Under the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, the Chief Constable, rather
than the Police Authority, is now responsible for civilian staff. Under the old regime,
the Authority had to provide executive services to the police while managing the
civilian staff, which made the Authority part of the police service while tasked with
monitoring and holding it to account. See id. 9T 5.13.
274. Id.
275. See id. $1 5.15.
276. See id. The Policing Commission found, in fact, that the community is not
aware of the Authority and its work, and there does not appear to be a mechanism for
holding the police publicly accountable. See id.
277. See id. T1 5.16. The Policing Commission states that the "prevailing instinct" of
the police was "defensive, reactive and cautious in response to questions [about their
work], as we experienced ourselves in relation to some of our own inquiries." Id.
278. See id.
279. See id. 5.17.
280. See id.
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abused their positions and should be dealt with accordingly.,
Therefore, to create public confidence, a complaints system should be
set up at the local level that can deal with complaints quickly,
effectively, and informally.'
To foster both democratic and legal accountability, and to increase
the transparency of police actions, the Commission recommends that
the existing Police Authority be replaced by a Policing Board, which
would hold the Chief Constable and the police service publicly to
account.m While the Secretary of State would be responsible for
setting long-term governmental objectives, the Board should also set
objectives for a three- to five-year period and adopt a strategy
prepared by the Chief Constable for implementation," including an
Annual Policing Plan' and an annual policing budget.' The Board
would also have responsibility for monitoring police performance
under these plans.'
The proposed Board could request that the Chief Constable retire,
and the Secretary of State could require the Board to retire the Chief
Constable, subject to consultation with the Board.3 The Northern
Ireland minister would also have the power to call for the Chief
Constable's retirement, subject to the agreement of the Policing
Board and the Secretary of State.' Overall, the Policing Board
would act as the disciplinary authority for chief officers and civilian
equivalents.29  As a result, the Board's authority over the police
would be clarified and would potentially increase the public's belief in
its effectiveness in holding the police accountable.
The Policing Commission believes that to ensure credibility, a
majority of the Policing Board's members should be elected.2'1
Therefore, it recommends that the Board have nineteen members.
Ten would be Assembly members drawn from the new Northern
Ireland Executive, who do not hold ministerial offices in the
281. Id. T 5.19.
282. See id. T 5.20. The Commission also argues that the Chief Constable, who is in
charge of spending money, should be principally accountable for how it is spent. At
present, the Chief Constable is not designated as an accounting officer. See id. 15.24.
283. See id. 6.2, 6.3.
284. See id 1 6.5. To simplify the roles of the Secretary of State, Police Authority,
and Chief Constable in planning and setting objectives, the Commission advocates
that the Secretary of State set long-term governmental objectives, the Policing Board
set medium-term objectives, and the police set short-term plans for delivery of those
objectives. See id. T 6.4.
285. See id. T 6.6.
286. See id. T 6.7.
287. Specifically, the Board would monitor crime trends, police performance in
public order situations, recruitment patterns, training, and complaints against the
police. See idi 9 6.8.
288. See id. 6.9.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. 6.11.
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Executive.2" The other nine would be independent members selected
from various fields-business, trade unions, voluntary organizations,
community groups, and the legal profession. 93  Here, the
Commission's objective is to create a Board that accurately reflects
the demographics of society, for it believes that "[n]either government
nor the police could easily disregard the views of a Board which has its
own democratic credentials. 294  The nine independent members
would further "command respect" for the Board by bringing relevant
expertise with them.295
Presently, if the Chief Constable believes a particular matter is
operational, the Police Authority cannot pursue it because it is a
matter of "operational independence." This term is not defined in
any legislation. Advocates of operational independence argue that
the Chief Constable should make decisions solely on matters about
which only he or she has all the facts and expertise, and that
independence minimizes political influence.296 However, the police
must be scrutinized in light of the powers they are given under the
emergency laws.297  The Commission therefore suggests the term
"operational responsibility" as a substitute, meaning that the Chief
Constable should make operational decisions, but that his or her
conduct should be open to inquiry or review.2 98 The Policing Board
could require the Chief Constable to report on his or her functions,
including those related to operational decisions. If the Chief
Constable believes this reporting to be inappropriate, the question
ultimately would be referred to the Secretary of State.299
Additionally, the Policing Board could initiate an inquiry into police
conduct, and would have the power to ask another agency to conduct
an inquiry, a power which the Police Authority presently does not
have.300
Although Community and Police Liaison Committees (CPLCs)
292. See id.
293. See id. 6.12. The Secretary of State would appoint these members after
consulting with the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. When responsibility for
policing is devolved, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister acting together
would make the appointments. See id. 6.13.
294. Id. $ 6.12.
295. Id.
296. See id. $ 6.20.
297. See id.
298. Id. 6.21.
299. See id. % 6.22. The Chief Constable might question the requirement to report
on matters involving national security, sensitive personnel matters, or cases before the
courts. See id.
300. Examples of these agencies are the Police Ombudsman, the Inspectorate of
Constabulary, the Audit Office, the Board's own staff, or private consultants. See id.
6.23. All members of the police service would be required to cooperate with the
inquiry. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 310-13 for a description of the
Ombudsman.
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currently exist, most citizens do not use them to voice their views.ml
To increase dialogue between the police and the community, the
Commission recommends that each District Council set up a District
Policing Partnership Board (DPPB).3 - The community would elect
the majority of its DPPB members, and the remaining independent
members would be selected by the Council with the agreement of the
Policing Board. 3 At monthly meetings between the DPPB and the
District Commander, police would present reports, answer questions,
and respond to community concerns.' The Policing Board would
consider the views of the DPPBs in forming policing plans and
strategies, 5 and the DPPB would submit an annual published report
to the District Council.3°1 To promote transparency, the Commission
recommends that the Policing Board meet in public once a month to
receive a report from the Chief Constable.'c that the DPPBs meet
publicly once a month to ask questions of the Board and the police, "
and that police practices should be made available for public scrutiny
unless it is in the public interest (rather than the police's interest) to
-withhold the information.3W
In 1997, Dr. Maurice Hayes recommended the creation of an
independent Police Ombudsman with an independent team of
investigators to review police complaints, a proposal which was passed
into law in 1998.310 The Commission recommends that the Police
Ombudsman become a significant institution in Northern Ireland and
urges that enough money be provided to conduct large-scale
investigations.3" The Ombudsman should be able to initiate inquiries
without a specific complaint, gather data on trends in complaints, and
coordinate with the police to address issues raised in the complaints. 312
Additionally, the Ombudsman could investigate and comment on
police policies and practices and bring problems to the attention of the
Chief Constable and Policing Board.3"3
301. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 6.25. Twenty-nine percent of
respondents in the Commission's public attitudes survey knew that CPLCs exist, but
40% of those did not know what the CPLCs actually do. See id.
302. See id. 6.26.
303. See id
304. See id. T 6.30.
305. See id.
306. See id 1 6.31. The Commission proposes funding for the DPPBs in
paragraphs 6.32 and 6.33.
307. See id. 6.36.
308. See id. 9 6.37.
309. See id 1 6.38. Specifically, police codes of practice and legal and ethical
guidelines governing police work should be made public, including covert aspects
such as surveillance and the handling of informants. See id. Additionally, clearly
drafted notes on matters of public interest should be readily available. See id.
310. See id. 1 6.40.
311. See id
312- See id
313. See id. 6.41.
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The Ombudsman provides the Board with another, more
specialized mechanism of inquiry into police behavior. Without these
mechanisms, the Board would be solely dependent on the Chief
Constable's reports, and would be powerless unless it was prepared to
call for the Chief Constable's retirement.314 With the establishment of
the Ombudsman, the Board could either initiate an inquiry itself or
utilize this alternate mechanism.35  These heightened and varied
powers of inquiry would potentially aid in increasing the overall
accountability of the police service.
3. Community Policing in a Peaceful Society
The security situation in Northern Ireland has recently improved.
Since the ceasefires, it is unusual to see army escorts and rifle-carrying
police officers. 316  To this end, the Commission recommends some
progressive changes to be implemented as the situation continues to
improve. For instance, newly built police stations should appear as
ordinary buildings rather than fortresses, 317 and should be made more
welcoming to the public and the workers within. 3I  Land rovers
should be used only in threatening situations, 319 and the army should
continue to withdraw support as the security situation improves so
that police are left to patrol on their own.320
Regarding the emergency powers, the Commission recommends
that legislation be the same in Northern Ireland as it is in the rest of
the United Kingdom, 32' and that records be kept that immediately
314. See id. 6.23. The Commission states, "[tjo be truly effective an institution
needs to have more than just one, extreme power which by its nature is difficult to
use." Id.
315. See id.
316. See Bar Report, supra note 28, at 6.
317. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 9! 8.5.
318. See id. 8.6. For instance, the Commission suggests that the public reception
areas be made more welcoming and that civilian receptionists replace police officers.
See id.
319. See id. 8.8.
320. See id. 8.11. The Commission dedicates a separate section to public order
policing, in which it recommends that the police should have the capacity to address
public order emergencies without the help of other services, and with only the present
level of support from the army. See id. 9.6. They further recommend coordination
between the police and organizers of parades, and marshal training for such events.
See id. I 9.9, 9.10. Instead of calling for a repeal of plastic bullets, the Commission
suggests that research be conducted to find alternatives, and that the police have a
range of options for public order equipment to decrease reliance on plastic bullets.
See id. 1$ 9.15, 9.16. The Commission presents specific rules to be followed for the
deployment of plastic bullets, such as videotaping incidents, whenever possible. in
which the use of such plastic bullets is authorized. See id. 9.17. Officers' numbers
should be clearly presented on their uniforms and protective clothing, and the
Policing Board and Ombudsman should monitor police performance in public order
situations, with the power to seek and follow up on reports. See id. $ 9.18, 9.19.
321. See supra Part I.A.2. for a discussion of Northern Ireland's emergency laws.
Currently, the EPA applies only to Northern Ireland. See supra note 39 and
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document all actions taken under the emergency powers, including
stops and searches. 322 If the threat of terrorism continues to require
special legislation, the Commission agrees with the British
government that these laws should be reviewed annually. -'
The Commission further recommends closing the holding centers at
Gough Barracks and Strand Road because the Commissioner for
Holding Centres has advised the Policing Commission that no reason
currently exists for holding detainees in separate centers from those
detained under PACE.24 Presently, the PACE custody suites have
audio recording, but the Commission suggests that they should have
video recording as well.az  The Policing Board would have
responsibility for inspecting the custody and interrogation suites,
while lay visitors could not only inspect the conditions of detention
but also observe interviews on camera with the detainee's consent. 36
Complaints about treatment would go to the Ombudsman.'
4. Management, Size, and Structure of the Service
The changes recommended in the Report cannot occur without a
commitment by police management. Therefore, the Commission
believes that specialists in change management, who may be either
civilians or police officers, should become part of the Northern
Ireland police leadership team.32 The leadership team would develop
and present a program for organizational changes to the Policing
Board.329  To allow these change managers to function, district
commanders would have authority over personnel in their command,
budgets, and financing of local policing initiatives.3 O
In its study, the Commission found that many officers did not know
what was expected of them in performing their jobs, indicating that
management had failed to outline what good performance entails. 331
The Commission therefore concludes that management's prime
responsibility is to ensure that the appraisal process is effective, and
that an officer's ability to change should be a factor in the officer
promotion and selection process.3 In addition, an automated trend
identification system would assist in tracking complaints, and police
accompanying text.
322. See Policing Report, supra note 21, % 8.14.
323. See id.; supra note 42.
324. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 1 8.15. All detainees in the future would
be detained in custody suites based in police stations. See id.
325. See id. 1 8.16.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. 1 10.3.
329. See id.
330. See id. 1 10.7.
331. See iU. 1 10.9.
332. See id 10.10.
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managers would conduct random checks on their officers' ability to
deal effectively with the public.3 33 The Commission recommends that
management use all of its resources to ensure that professional and
ethical standards are met.33 It also advocates civilianization of the
force, particularly in the areas of personnel, finance, and
administration .3 3  The goal of placing highly-qualified civilians in jobs
that do not require police powers or training is to improve efficiency,
bring forth a broader range of expertise, and develop a more open
police culture.336
The Policing Commission found the current structure of the police
service to be unnecessarily complicated, driven primarily by the
response to security threats.337  It therefore makes several
recommendations for restructuring and simplifying the service, 3 1
which include merging the Special Branch and the Crime Branch. 39
These branches would be brought together under the command of a
single Assistant Chief Constable, and fewer officers would work in
this command to eliminate the possibility of a "force within a force." 340
Additionally, the future police service would not have a Full Time
Reserve, 1 and the Part Time Reserve would be expanded to 2500
officers with the new recruits coming from underrepresented areas.-12
With 13,000 officers, the RUC is a huge police service for a
population of 1.675 million people343 and as such, it should be
substantially reduced to about 7500 officers over the next ten years .3
Keeping certain assumptions in mind, 5 the Commission recommends
333. See id. 10.12, 10.14.
334. See id. 10.15.
335. See id. 10.22.
336. See id. $T 10.22, 10.23.
337. See id. $ 12.3. The Special Branch, headed by its own Assistant Chief
Constable, is composed of more than one tenth of all RUC officers, with its own
support services, including an aircraft. See id. 12.2.
338. See generally id. ch. 12 (discussing structural changes in the organization of the
police service).
339. See id. 12.12 (recommending that the Special Branch and Crime Branch "be
brought together under the command of a single Assistant Chief Constable"). The
Special Branch deals with undercover anti-terrorist work. See Dickson, The Legal
System, supra note 31, at 26.
340. Policing Report, supra note 21, 12.11-12.13.
341. The Full Time Reserve resulted from the security situation in the last 30 years,
and it consists of 2900 officers who work with three-year contracts to support the
ordinary police service with security-related work. They carry out the same duties as
the RUC and experience the same amount of risk. See id. $ 12.17.
342. See id. 9 12.18. Currently, there are 1300 officers in the Part Time Reserve.
See id. 91 12.17.
343. See id. 13.1.
344. See id. T 13.9.
345. In proposing a model for change, the Commission makes a number of
assumptions, including that normal retirement is at 50 years of age (management can
decline early retirement if the officer's skills are still needed), that about 80% of
officers will retire, and that about 800 officers under age 50 with more than five years
of experience may opt to take an early retirement package. See id. 91 13.11.
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that severance packages include generous payments for early retiring
officers.4 Further recommendations include a Training and
Employment Agency to assist retiring officers who are seeking new
jobs,347 that recruiting agencies in Great Britain consider the
experience of RUC reservists in their applications, -' and that the
British government should allow former reservists to participate in
United Nations peacekeeping operations. - 9
5. Composition, Recruitment, Training, and Culture
The RUC is hardly representative of the population in Northern
Ireland. The Commission states that "real community policing is
impossible if the composition of the police service bears little
relationship to the composition of the community as a whole."3-" The
community in its entirety will have a stake in the police force if they
"see the police as their police," which will in turn facilitate more
effective policing by solidifying a partnership between the citizenry
and the police."1 To this end, the Commission suggests recruiting
more Catholics/nationalists, women, homosexuals, and other
underrepresented classes of people to facilitate cooperation between
community members and the service.3  Specifically, the Commission
presents a model to recruit 50% Catholic and 50% Protestant officers
over a period of ten years.35  The Policing Board, NIO Police
Division, and the office of the Police Ombudsman should also
represent the population of Northern Ireland, and every effort should
be made to ensure that this occurs. 354
Some applicants to the police service have been discouraged or
intimidated by their communities from applying because of the
identification of the force with unionism -.3 5  The Commission
recommends that community leaders encourage their youth to apply
for the force,356 that connections be formed between police, schools,
346. See id. 13.12. The chart in box 9 of the Report shows the Commission's plan
for the changing size of the police service over the next ten years. The chart in box 10
displays a model of the proportions of current officers to officers recruited over the
ten-year period, and the chart in box 11 shows how much the ten-year plan could cost.
See id. I 13.15, 13.16.
347. See id. 1 13.17.
348. See id. 13.19.
349. See id. 1 13.20.
350. Id 1 14.2.
351. Id 9 14.3.
352. See id. 11 14.4-14.9.
353. See id. 14.9.
354. See id. 1 14.17.
355. See id. 9 15.1.
356. See id. 1 15.2. "Community leaders" include political party leaders, local
councillors, bishops, priests, schoolteachers, and sports authorities. Furthermore, it
calls on the Gaelic Athletic Association to change its rule prohibiting police from
being members. See id.
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and universities,357 and that pilot-cadet schemes be established in
particularly underrepresented areas.358
Changing the composition of the senior ranks of the police service
presents the problem of encouraging more Catholics to apply for
senior positions 9.35  The Commission recommends that the recruiting
agency identify Catholic officers serving outside of Northern Ireland
and encourage them to apply in Northern Ireland,3 ° as well as
encourage lateral entry of experienced officers or recruits from non-
police organizations. 61
Currently, officers receive little or no training in furtherance of the
objectives that drive the service. For example, many officers in the
survey indicated that they received little training in community
awareness or human rights 6.36  Because there is presently no budget
for training, the Commission recommends that a comprehensive
budget be established,363 and that a police college be built to
accommodate training facilities.M Civilians should be incorporated
into the training process as instructors, and the training exercises
should be conducted on university premises, ideally with non-police
students. Currently, the RUC spends almost twice as much time on
drill training than other United Kingdom police services do, so that
the hours spent on drill would be significantly reduced to incorporate
human rights training.366
Those officers already in service must be retrained to understand
the impact of the new constitutional system in Northern Ireland, new
policing arrangements, and the new procedures of the criminal justice
system. Each officer should take a course for this purpose,367 and
receive instruction discussing the implications for policing of the
Human Rights Act 1998, as well as the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.',
Managers should also undergo management training with at least one
course in a non-police environment.3 69  Management workshops
357. See id. 15.4.
358. See id. T 15.6. The Commission also makes suggestions for broad advertising
in both the United Kingdom and the Republic. See id. 15.8. Flexible working
arrangements are also recommended, as well as a short recruiting process of six
months so that interested parties have less time to withdraw due to peer pressure,
second thoughts, or impatience. See id. T 15.12.
359. See id. 15.17.
360. See id.
361. See id. 15.18.
362. See id. 16.3.
363. See id. 16.5.
364. See id. 9 16.6.
365. See id. 9 16.10.
366. See id. 9 16.14.
367. See id. 91 16.20.
368. See id. 16.21; supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
369. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 91 16.22.
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should discuss changes in police organization,3 7 and all officers should
participate in a neighborhood-policing training program.7
To encourage transparency, the Commission suggests that the
training curricula be publicly available 72 The public would also be
able to attend some training sessions.3n The Report indicates that
some United States police departments run "citizens academies,"
which provide public courses to demonstrate police procedures,
explain the legal context in which police operate and the constraints
they operate under, and to show how a citizen can be involved in
policing. 74 Following these models, the Commission suggests that the
new police college offer a pilot citizens program to gauge interest.?"
The name and symbols of the RUC have become particularly
politicized, and many nationalists and republicans associate them with
the British state. This creates a problem because many of the people
of Northern Ireland do not view the police service as their own.Y6 To
achieve the goal of community policing, the Commission feels that
people must be able to identify wvith the symbols of the force.rn To
this end, they recommend that the name of the RUC be changed to
the neutral Northern Ireland Police Service, that the RUC adopt a
new badge and symbols that are not associated with either the British
or the Irish states, that the Union flag not be flown from police
buildings, and that a new flag be created that is not associated with
either the British or the Irish state.378  Finally, all levels of
management should be responsible for maintaining a neutral working
environment.379
The Commission advocates cooperation with other police services,
particularly the Garda Siochana in the Republic of Ireland, to
promote effective policing in a country where much of the crime has a
"cross-border dimension. '381 Written protocols by both services
covering aspects of cooperation, 38 an annual conference between the
two police services to discuss concerns,I and personnel exchanges"s
would further the goal of crime detection and prevention.' The
370. See id
371. See id. 16.24.
372. See id T 16.25.
373. See id. 1 16.26.
374. Id
375. See id.
376. See id 1 17.4.
377. See id 9 17.6.
378. See id
379. See id 9 17.9.
380. The Garda Siochana is the name of the police force in the Republic of Ireland.
381. Id 1 18.2.
382. See id T 18.7.
383. See it 1 18.8.
384. See id 118.10.
385. In addition, cooperation in training and joint disaster planning would help
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RUC could also benefit from exchanges and cooperation with services
elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and the Commission advocates
exchanges with police services in Great Britain,386 joint training, and
"structured links" to services in England, the Republic of Ireland, and
Scotland.38  International training exchanges should also be
developed, particularly in areas where Northern Ireland police need
international police cooperation.3 8
With regard to implementation of its proposals, the Commission
cautions against "cherry-picking," or implementing some elements
and not others.389 A mechanism is also necessary to oversee these
changes and to instill confidence in the community where the
Commission's recommendations are being implemented.390 Following
the example of the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell to
facilitate the peace process,391 an "eminent" person from outside of
the United Kingdom or Northern Ireland should be appointed as an
oversight commissioner to supervise the implementation of the
recommendations. 39 The Policing Board and DPPBs would provide
the commissioner with their objectives and report on their progress.3 93
The commissioner would then publicly report on the progress
achieved, and discuss whether problems that emerge are the result of
policing institutions or matters that are beyond their control.394 The
oversight commissioner would be reappointed every five years.395
C. Reactions
Immediately following the publication of the Report in September,
further relationships between the two forces and promote sharing of expertise. The
Commission also recommends the establishment of communications between the
Garda and the Northern Ireland police through improved radio links, compatible
informational technology systems, and joint databases in areas of cross-border crime.
See id. 9191 18.12, 18.14, 18.15.
386. See id. 18.16.
387. Id. $ 18.17.
388. See id. 18.18.
389. Id. $ 19.2.
390. See id. 91 19.3.
391. In 1995, President Clinton appointed Senator George Mitchell as Special
Advisor to the President and Secretary of State to consider economic initiatives in
Northern Ireland. The British and Irish governments then asked him to chair the
International Commission on Disarmament in Northern Ireland. Senator Mitchell
was formally appointed in June 1996 as chairman of the Northern Ireland peace talks,
which ultimately resulted in the Agreement on April 10, 1999. Senator Mitchell
received the Philadelphia Peace Prize and the Fordham-Stein Prize, and was
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his skill in negotiating the Agreement. See
Michael A. Cooper, Introduction to the Alexis C. Coudert Memorial Lecture at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Dec. 10, 1998), in 54 The Record of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 137, 143-44 (1999).
392. Policing Report, supra note 21, 91 19.4.
393. See id. 91 9.5.
394. See id.
395. See id. T1 19.6.
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former Secretary of State Mo Mowlam praised the Commission for
"chart[ing] the way forward for the best possible police service in
Northern Ireland."3 96 She also indicated that there would be further
consultation on the Report's 175 recommendations, and through a
government consultation phone line, people from the community
could voice responses to the Report.3" The target date for a full
implementation plan was December of 1999, but all of the proposed
changes cannot be made at once.398 While some changes can be made
without implementing legislation, some require legislation in order to
take effect, and others may take years to fully complete.3
The Report drew varied reactions from the community. David
Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party and First Minister
(Designate) of the Northern Ireland Assembly, called a number of
changes "unnecessary," including the RUC name change. He
argued that "alterations in names and symbols mean least to those
who strongly oppose the RUC," and he does not view the symbols as
political."° In addition, Trimble stated that the religious affiliation of
the existing Catholic policemen and women in the RUC and the
reserve provides "no evidence that their religion helps to diminish the
opposition of paramilitaries."' Trimble attacked many proposals as
"counter to common sense and common decency without any firm
foundation or evidence." 3  The Chief Constable welcomed the
suggestions regarding implementation of human rights awareness, but
stressed that diminishing the size of the force and merging the Special
Branch and Crime Branch can occur only as the security situation
allows.4o4
Human rights organizations were pleased with the commitment to
human rights contained in the Report. 5  However, they also
expressed disappointment with the Report's failure to call for an
immediate end to emergency legislation and the absence of a
mechanism to ensure that the police officers who committed past
396. Northern Ireland Information Service, Secretary of State's Statement on the








404. See RUC Press Release, Chief Constable's Initial Response to Patten Report(visited Mar. 27,2000), available on <http://vww.ruc.police.uklpress/1999/sep/pattonl.
htm> [hereinafter RUC, Chief Constable's Response.
405. See, e.g., Committee on the Administration of Justice Press Release, CAJ
Reaction to Patten Report, Sept. 9, 1999 (visited Mar. 27, 2000), available on
<http://ourworld.compuserve.comhomepages/Comm-Admin'-Justicellatestpressrelea
ses.htm#September9> (acknowledging positive recommendations in Patten Report).
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human rights abuses do not remain on the force.4 6 Furthermore,
some commentators expressed disappointment that the Report failed
entirely to address the issue of the intimidation of defense lawyers,
and the Nelson and Finucane murders in particular.4 °0
In addition, other commentators stressed that the key to the
effectiveness of the Commission's proposals is implementation. For
instance, the Policing Report is unclear on how much power the
DPPBs will actually have, because the new Board need only
"consider" the views of the DPPBs in policy formation and
strategies.40 Without power to truly implement changes, the DPPBs
are not likely be more effective than the existing Community Police
Liaison Committees.4° Issues regarding the timing of implementation
will also be important. The Chief Constable indicated approval to
move forward with those recommendations that are "not security
dependent," but noted that others will be implemented as the security
situation allows. 410 Depending on who makes these timing decisions,
progress on the proposals could be slow and ultimately ineffective.
On January 19, 2000, Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Mandelson
announced plans to propose a policing Bill in February to create the
revamped service." The Bill, which will likely become law in the
autumn of 2000, is in accord with the Policing Commission's proposals
to change the name of the service and its composition.1 2 The
Government plans to put the changes into effect within twenty
months from January 2000.413
406. See id.; see also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Media Alert, Northern
Ireland's Patten Report on Policing: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Praises
Constructive Recommendations, But Criticizes the Omission of Key Issues, Sept. 9,
1999 (visited Mar. 27, 2000), available on <http://www.lchr.orglmedia/nirO999.htm>
[hereinafter Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Patten Report] (noting that the
Lawyers Committee expressed disappointment at Patten's neglect to call for an end to
emergency legislation).
407. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Patten Report, supra note 406; see
also Julia Hall, Northern Ireland: A New Beginning to Policing? (Human Rights
Watch, New York, New York), Nov. 1999, vol. 11, no. 15(D), at 11 (stating that "[iut is
striking ... that the commission's final report does not make recommendations
regarding defense lawyer intimidation"); Representative Chris Smith, Statement
before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights at House of
Representatives 2 (Sept. 24, 1999) (on file with Fordham Law Review) (stating that
"the report fails to make recommendations that would curb the harassment of
defense attorneys and there is not a mention of the ongoing, still evolving implications
of RUC-Special Branch complicity in the Finucane murder").
408. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 6.30; Maggie Beirne, Patten's
Programme for Policing, Just News (Bull. Comm. on Admin. of Just., Belfast,
Northern Ireland), Sept. 1999, vol. 15, no.9, at 1, 4.
409. See Beirne, supra note 408, at 4.
410. See RUC, Chief Constable's Response, supra note 404.
411. See Frank Millar, Mandelson to Table Bill Next Month on New Police Service,
Irish Times, Jan. 20, 2000, at 1.
412. See id.
413. See Warren Hoge, Britain to Shrink the Ulster Constabulary and Broaden its
Ranks, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,2000, at A5.
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Through its recommendations, the Policing Commission made a
significant stride toward changing the police service in Northern
Ireland to better serve its citizens. Overall, these institutional changes
may result in attitudinal changes and potentially foster a stronger
relationship between the police and the community as a whole.
However, the Report left some gaps that must be further scrutinized
before the Agreement's democratic and peaceful goals can be truly
achieved, specifically with regard to the situation of defense lawyers.
The next part argues that although the Policing Commission's
proposals may indirectly help to alleviate the problem of intimidation
of defense lawyers, they do not go far enough to completely eradicate
the problem. Part III asserts that the Policing Commission should
have directly addressed the issues of lawyer intimidation, human
rights abusers who remain on the force, and the repeal of emergency
legislation.
III. GAPS IN THE REPORT: THE CONTINUING PLIGHT OF DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS
This part applies the recommendations of the Policing Commission
to the problems facing defense lawyers in Northern Ireland and
considers whether those suggestions will truly alleviate problems of
intimidation and harassment. Lawyers currently operate in an
environment in which they regularly experience threats and
interference with the attorney-client relationship and the right to
counsel of choice. Evidence suggests that the police are key figures in
administering these types of abuses. Along with the Policing
Commission's recommendations comes the opportunity for significant
changes in policing in Northern Ireland, which could in turn abate
future abuses of defense lawyers. The Policing Report contains many
recommendations that, if implemented, may help defense lawyers
facing harassment and police interference in Northern Ireland. The
focus given to implementing human rights norms throughout the
force414 the mechanisms suggested to increase police accountability,4 5
and the potential change in police composition to make the force
more representative of the community1 6 could create an environment
in which attorneys are better able to do their jobs effectively and
safely. But the recommendations do not go far enough toward
combatting the problem of solicitor threats and intimidation. The
Commission should have recommended a mechanism to remove past
human rights offenders from the force, called for a repeal of
emergency legislation, and specifically addressed the problem of the
intimidation of defense lawyers in its provisions.
414. See supra Part II.B.1.
415. See supra Part II.B.2.
416. See supra Part II.B.4.
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A. Implementation May Alleviate the Abuses
The Commission argued in its Report that a human rights program
would ensure respect for human rights both technically and
behaviorally if police know the laws well, master skills, and as a result
instinctually learn to respect individual rights. 17 In furtherance of this
program, the Commission made specific recommendations regarding
the incorporation of human rights into codes of ethics and practice,
police training, and appraisals. 18 All of these proposals could
improve the situation of defense lawyers.
The new Code of Ethics and Code of Practice proposed by the
Commission would integrate the European Convention on Human
Rights into police practice.4 19 Under the model recommended by the
Commission, a police officer would take an oath to uphold
fundamental human rights and display respect and compassion toward
every individual.420 These codes, if implemented, clearly attempt to
bring a human rights mentality to the police force. Evidence of
defense attorney intimidation suggests that some police officers, to
this point, have not treated lawyers with respect or compassion. 2'
Requiring both new and existing officers to take the oath brings their
duty to treat lawyers respectfully to the fore, and could create an
awareness in the police force that did not previously exist.
Presumably, the Policing Commission emphasizes human rights in the
police oath so that officers will take the idea of respecting individual
rights seriously. In taking the oath, officers would be formally
asserting their willingness to respect human rights. Elevating the
status of human rights in this way could inspire officers who do not
wish to violate a formal commitment to refrain from participating in
abuses.
The new training scheme may also reduce the harassment of
defense lawyers by training new officers and retraining existing
officers in the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, the European
Convention on Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.422 By reducing the hours spent on drills and replacing
them with human rights training, officers' attention will again be
drawn to the importance of respect for human rights in effective
policing. Furthermore, this training is aimed at providing practical
skills rather than simply stating goals, so that officers would
immediately be able to recognize the effects of their actions in a true
417. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
420. See Policing Report, supra note 21, at Annex 5. The model code would be the
draft code produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 1992,
updated to take the Human Rights Act 1998 into account.
421. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 250-54,368 and accompanying text.
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policing situation.4 3
Using awareness of human rights issues as an important element in
the appraisal of police behavior 424 further suggests to police officers
themselves the need to take human rights seriously. If officers know
that their awareness of human rights in executing their jobs will be
reviewed by a superior, presumably their adherence to human rights
standards will improve. Moreover, under the new scheme, officers
would be aware that adherence to human rights standards is a crucial
part of their jobs and as such, would potentially be less inclined to
engage in human rights violations against defense attorneys than they
have in the past. Additionally, officers will have further incentive to
respect human rights if the Policing Board is closely monitoring their
behavior, as recommended by the Commission.4 The Commission's
recommendations thus provide a promising start for increasing
accountability and transparency through the establishment of the
Policing Board and an effective complaints system. The overall
emphasis placed on human rights in the proposed policing scheme
marks awareness of civil liberties as a topic of utmost importance and
heightens individual awareness.
If the Commission's recommendations regarding the Policing Board
are put into effect, the Board will have authority not only to propose
plans and monitor police compliance, but also to act as a disciplinary
authority.4' As a result, officers may be less inclined to harass
lawyers for fear they will be held accountable to the Board, which
could then initiate an inquiry into their conduct or ask another
agency, such as the Ombudsman, to do so." If the public is able to
hold the police accountable for abuses of authority, it would seem that
much of the battle for protection against the intimidation of lawyers
would be won. Arguably, officers would stop engaging in activity that
poses a personal threat to their careers. Additionally, the Board could
require the Chief Constable to report on actions that include
operational decisions.4" Presently, the police operate in an
environment where they are effectively free to operate at will without
negative repercussions, for there exists no effective monitoring
mechanism. The establishment of the Policing Board could change
this, and therefore improve the situation for defense lawyers through
increased accountability and redress of complaints.
By proposing that the Police Ombudsman be a significant
institution in Northern Ireland, the Commission provides another
423. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 257,300 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text (stating that the Board could
request the Chief Constable's retirement).
427. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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potential safeguard for defense lawyers.4 29 Having an Ombudsman
with sufficient funding who could initiate inquiries without a specific
complaint, gather data on trends in complaints, and instigate large-
scale investigations may give lawyers much more confidence in the
system.430 Already, a great deal of information has been gathered
suggesting that the harassment of defense lawyers is a persistent
problem in Northern Ireland, and this has been confirmed by the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers.431 With the Ombudsman and the Policing Board in
place, lawyers would have an independent forum in which to voice
their concerns without the fear that they would not be heard. These
mechanisms could prevent future tragedies like those of Patrick
Finucane and Rosemary Nelson.
The proposed Policing Board is significantly different from the
existing Police Authority so as to not duplicate the same problems."'
The more representative composition of the proposed majority-
elected Board433 could help to alleviate fears that the Board would
consistently side with the police. Additionally, through public
meetings, the Board would be open to questions from the public
which would promote the transparency of its actions, and would
consider the views of the DPPBs in creating its plans and policies. 4
34
Many of these recommendations are aimed at providing a police
service that is more attuned to the views of the community.435 As the
security situation in Northern Ireland improves, the Commission has
recommended changes that will make the police less intimidating to
the community as safeguards are no longer needed.436
Recommendations such as closing the holding centers at Gough
Barracks and Strand Road could improve the situation for lawyers
because these facilities are often the sites of threats and harassment.437
Furthermore, inspection of and audio/video recording in PACE suites
would be a further disincentive to police to threaten either clients or
429. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
432. Currently, the Police Authority has problems with accountability and has a
membership unrepresentative of the community. See supra notes 260-61 and
accompanying text. Its powers are also limited, and the community perceives it to be
allied with the police force rather than impartial. See supra notes 270-74 and
accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
435. For example, the DPPBs provide a forum for voicing concerns publicly, and
requiring police to report publicly allows the community to know what the police are
doing.
436. See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 103, 324 and accompanying text. The center at Castlereagh
was recently closed.
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their lawyers, for such threats could be documented and observed.'-
To depoliticize policing in Northern Ireland, the composition of the
police should be highly representative of the community. In cases in
which lawyers have been intimidated, police comments indicate that
they have been targeted for what the police believe to be their
political views. 39 If the service were more representative, it would
likely be viewed by the community as more neutral and therefore
more fair. In addition, police officers from different backgrounds
working together could educate one another about the varying views
of Northern Ireland's citizens on the issue of policing, which may lead
to greater cognizance of how officers can respect the rights of defense
lawyers and their detainees. Once the focus of the force is on
effective policing, rather than on politics, there should be a correlative
decrease in police intimidation of lawyers.
Of course, the problem remains of encouraging underrepresented
groups to apply to the police force, which is not likely to occur
quickly. However, if the Commission's suggestions to diversify
institutions such as the Policing Board are followed to make it more
representative of the population, minorities may follow suit when
making their application decisions. Additionally, underrepresented
communities would then have greater reason to encourage applicants
if they saw that changes were truly being made through these
mechanisms.
Implementation of the Policing Commission's proposals will
undoubtedly cause great changes in the functioning of the police force
in Northern Ireland. The structural and philosophical adjustments
may generate a mindset within the force that can positively alter the
institutional context in which defense lawyers work. Diversification
among police members and the creation of an effective Policing Board
and complaints system will make the police more accountable and
transparent to the community, and will increase scrutiny of the force,
thereby lessening the likelihood of threats against lawyers. New and
greater emphasis on human rights may also cause officers to take
liberty violations more seriously, particularly when the
aforementioned structural mechanisms exist to hold them
accountable. These changes, although critical first steps, are not
enough, however, because the Policing Commission failed to address
issues crucial to eliminating the problems that confront defense
lawyers.
438. See supra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 5, 110,119 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
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B. The Recommendations Will Not Completely Eradicate the
Problem of Intimidation
Although its recommendations are promising, the Policing
Commission still could have gone further in alleviating the problems
that defense lawyers face in Northern Ireland. The Report should
have taken the opportunity to recommend a specific mechanism for
removing past human rights offenders, called for a repeal of
emergency legislation, and specifically addressed the problem of
intimidation of defense lawyers.
In addressing the issue of past violations, the Commission
presumably believes that its recommendations to change the
composition of the police service will cause some past human rights
offenders to leave the service." Existing officers, meanwhile, will be
retrained in the new policing practices and will take a new oath, such
that those who cannot abide by the new terms will presumably leave
the force either of their own free will or through termination for
continued abuses."4  Furthermore, under restructuring proposals,
nearly half of the service would consist of new members within a short
period of time.443
It is arguably unrealistic that those who have committed abuses in
the past will be so easily removed or their behavior altered by taking a
new oath or undergoing retraining. Furthermore, failure to formally
create a mechanism to weed out the "bad apples" creates a
disincentive for Catholics/nationalists to join the force when they
know that those who engaged in abuses in the past without
repercussions are probably still employed in the service. In addition,
proposals for changing the composition of the force are aimed mostly
at the entry levels, and therefore leave the higher ranks intact. Thus,
the effect of the implemented changes may not be felt for years, since
those in controlling positions were in control prior to the reform.
These wrongdoers may never be held accountable, which perpetuates
the lack of public confidence in the force and leaves defense attorneys
open to intimidation by the very officers who have threatened them in
the past. The Commission states that it was "not charged with a
quasi-legal investigation of the past,"' but that its "aim is to help
441. See Beirne, supra note 408, at 4-5.
442. See id.; supra notes 250-57 and accompanying text. The Commission's
suggested text for the oath is:
I hereby do solemnly and sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will
faithfully discharge the duties of the office of constable, and that in so doing
I will act with fairness, integrity, diligence and impartiality, uphold
fundamental human rights and accord equal respect to all individuals and to
their traditions and beliefs.
Policing Report, supra note 21, 4.7.
443. See Policing Report, supra note 21, 14.12.
444. Id. T 1.6.
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ensure that past tragedies are not repeated in the future." '  However,
the same officers who allegedly harassed Rosemary Nelson still
remain on the force. The Commission, without conducting an
"investigation," could have at least assigned authority to an
independent mechanism that would ensure that past abusers would
not be retained on the force.'
Secondly, the Commission should have taken the opportunity to
call for a repeal of the emergency legislation, which significantly
contributes to the intimidation problem." 7 Giving police such
extensive and unreviewable powers under these laws creates an
environment ripe for abuse. By allowing stops without reasonable
suspicion, denying detainees access to solicitors, and giving
tremendous weight to confessional evidence, both detainees and their
solicitors are placed at the will of the police and the criminal justice
system, which allows officers to engage in systematic coercion and
intimidation.' Although sporadic violence still exists in Northern
Ireland, the country is arguably no longer in an emergency state and
as such, does not need its emergency laws. 9 With the passage of the
Human Rights Act 1998, the Government placed more emphasis on
the protection of human rights and recognized the need for a forum in
which to challenge violations.45 The Commission itself devotes a
great deal of space to human rights in its Report.4 - It is therefore
inconsistent to fail to call for a repeal of the very laws that
systematically deny the protection of these rights. Although the
Criminal Justice Review may be able to propose changes that the
Policing Commission overlooked, its proposals relate to criminal
justice arrangements other than policing and emergency legislation.
Increasingly, the international community is recognizing the special
position that human rights defenders such as defense lawyers hold in
society and the consequent need for their protection.4 - The problem
of the intimidation of defense lawyers is a pervasive one in Northern
445. Id. 1.7.
446. In fact, some commentators, prior to the Report's publication, provided the
Commission with recommendations for vetting officers who have engaged in human
rights abuses from the force. See Hall, supra note 407, app. A, p. 17 (Briefing Paper
for the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, Jan. 16, 1999)
(describing structure of a vetting unit independent of political influence that would
conduct "a thorough background check that mines several legitimate sources of
information.., to determine whether or not a police officer has been involved in
human rights abuses").
447. See supra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
448. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, At the Crossroads, supra note 58,
at 117.
449. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
451. See Policing Report, supra note 21, at ch. 4; supra notes 244-57 and
accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 165-91 and accompanying text.
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Ireland, which evidence suggests is connected to police activities
aimed at harassment and interference with the attorney-client
relationship.4 54 By not referring to this problem at all, or to the
Nelson and Finucane murders, the Policing Commission has failed to
alert the Government to a particularly significant policing problem.
Anticipating this criticism, the Commission states that it did not have
judicial inquiry power, and that without investigative power or
subpoena power it could not address the issues of independent
inquiries into the Nelson and Finucane murders. 55 Furthermore, as a
forward-looking Commission, the Commission contends that it would
have been wrong to address issues of investigating specific past
abuses.456 However, the Commission did have the freedom to survey
problems inherent in Northern Ireland's criminal justice system, and it
was charged with the duty of reporting its findings to the
Government.457 In addition to the fact of Nelson's and Finucane's
murders, ongoing allegations of threats by police and the attention
given by the international community to the problem of attorney
intimidation in Northern Ireland indicate that abuse and harassment
of defense solicitors is a pernicious and troubling aspect of the
criminal justice system. 4 8 Even though it did not wish to call for
independent inquiries into Nelson's and Finucane's tragic deaths, the
Commission had the authority and opportunity to highlight the issue
of attorney intimidation in its report and to make specific
recommendations. In neglecting this opportunity, the Commission
perpetuates the lack of confidence in the police service and
contributes to the ongoing problem of attorney intimidation in
Northern Ireland.
CONCLUSION
Despite the recent positive changes in Northern Ireland's security
situation, the intimidation and harassment of defense lawyers remains
a problem, as evidenced by the continuing allegations of harassment
made by defense lawyers and the recent murder of Rosemary Nelson.
As human rights defenders, lawyers in Northern Ireland should be
afforded protection to perform their jobs effectively and to represent
the accused in a tense political climate. The Policing Commission
made many recommendations for policing reform that may assist
lawyers representing terrorist suspects, but neglected to make the
problem of attorney intimidation an important part of its report or to
make recommendations that will completely eliminate the problem.
The Commission's proposals should be implemented soon to begin
454. See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
455. See Policing Report, supra note 21, T 1.6.
456. See id.
457. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 102-43, 165-91 and accompanying text.
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the process of policing reform. But before legislation is solidified,
provisions should be added to remove past offenders from the force
and to directly address the issue of attorney intimidation. At the same
time, commentators should pick up where the Commission left off and
call for a repeal of emergency legislation, thereby increasing
international attention to the problem of intimidation and harassment
of defense lawyers in Northern Ireland.
Notes & Observations
